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ABSTRACT 
EUROSCEPTICISM OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN POLAND AND CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
Aksoy, Deniz 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof.Dimitris Tsarouhas 
September 2011 
 
This study is an attempt to explore the distinctive character of Europeanization of 
the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) and seeks to contribute to 
the development of the literature on Europeanization of political parties. The main 
inquiry is to analyze the relationship between Europeanization of political parties 
and party-level Euroscepticism. The study argues that party-level Euroscepticism 
is not merely an effect, but also a clear manifestation of Europeanization process.  
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ÖZET 
POLONYA VE ÇEK CUMHURĠYETĠ’NDEKĠ SĠYASAL PARTĠLERĠN 
AVRUPA-KUġKUCULUĞU 
Aksoy, Deniz 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası ĠliĢkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd.Doç. Dimitris Tsarouhas 
Eylül 2011 
 
Bu çalıĢma Orta ve Doğu Avrupa ülkelerinin AvrupalılaĢma sürecinin ayırd edici 
özelliklerini belirlemeye ve siyasi partilerin AvrupalılaĢması literatürüne katkıda 
bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Siyasi partilerin AvrupalılaĢma süreci ile partilerin 
avrupa kuĢkucu politikaları arasındaki iliĢki çalıĢmanın temel araĢtırma odağını 
oluĢturmaktadır.Bu çerçevede, çalıĢma Avrupa kuĢkucu parti politikalarının 
Avrupa BütünleĢme sürecinin sadece bir sonucu olmaktan ziyade, AvrupalılaĢma 
sürecinin açık bir göstergesi olduğu fikrini savunmaktadır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Siyasi partilerin AvrupalılaĢması, siyasi partilerin Avrupa 
kuĢkuculuğu 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
It is an honor for me to thank those who made this thesis possible. I owe my 
deepest gratitude to my parents and brother for their heavenly support throughout 
my study. My expression of thanks likewise will never suffice.  
This thesis would not have been possible without the guidance, friendship, 
patience, motivation and support of my thesis supervisor, Asst. Prof. Dimitris 
Tsarouhas, who has always been invaluable on both an academic and a personal 
level, for which I am extremely grateful.  
I would like to acknowledge the academic and financial support of Bilkent 
University and the Department of International Relations. I am grateful to the 
University library for its facilities and the help of librarians. 
Finally, I am deeply indebted to many of my colleagues for their 
unequivocal friendship and personal support throughout the last two years. It is a 
great pleasue to thank those; Ġsmail Erkam Sula, Ġlke Taylan Yurdakul, AyĢe 
Yedekçi,YaĢar Kemal ġan and I would like to thank Hakan Yavuzyılmaz for 
providing me with feedback and assistance, which have been a valuable support. 
Last but not the least, I would like to thank the founders of the Society of Young 
Academics (SYA) for organizing academic discussions and social activities, 
which promote a more stimulating and interactive academic and social 
environment at Bilkent University.  
 
 
v 
 
  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………........iii 
ÖZET……………………………………………………………………………...iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS…………………………………………………………v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………………vi 
LIST OF TABLES……………………………………………………………....viii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS……………………………………………………ix 
CHAPTER I:  INTRODUCTION…………………………………………. …….1 
CHAPTER II: EUROPEANIZATION AS  A FRAMEWORK…………………..7 
2.1 A Review of the Literature on Europeanization…………………….......7 
  2.1.1. Conceptualizing the Europeanization of CEECs…………..17 
         2.2 Political Parties and Europeanization…………………………………..24 
           2.2.1 The Evolution of Modern Political Parties…………………24 
2.2.2 The Classification of Party Models………………………...26 
2.3 The Europeanization of Political Parties Literature……………………29 
CHAPTER III: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE POLITICS OF  
 EUROSCEPTICISM…………………………………………………………….35 
 
3.1   Euroscepticism and Party Attitudes toward European Integration in 
Western Europe……………………………………………………………38 
vi 
3.2 Impact of the European Issue on the National Politics of the CEECs: 
“Return to Europe”………………………………………………………...49 
3.2.1 Euroscepticism and Party Attitudes toward European 
Integration in Central and Eastern Europe………………………53 
3.2.2 Conceptualization of Party-Based Euroscepticism in the 
Context of Central and Eastern European Countries……………56 
CHAPTER IV:  EUROSCEPTICISM AS A REALIGNING ISSUE IN POLISH            
PARTY POLITICS………………………………………………………………66 
4.1 The Main Features of the Polish Party System………………………..70 
4.2 The Analysis of Polish Parliamentary Elections and Presidential 
Elections………………………………………………………………...…72 
4.3 The June 2003 Polish EU Accession Referendum…………………….89  
4.4 The June 2004 European Parliament Election…………………………92 
CHAPTER V:  EUROSCEPTICISM AS A FEATURE OF MAINSTREAM 
PARTY POLITICS IN CZECH REPUBLIC…………………………………...95 
5.1 The Analysis of Czech Parliamentary Elections………………………97 
5.2 The 2003 Czech EU Accession Referendum…………………………117 
         5.3 The 2004 European Parliament Election……………………………..119 
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION……………………………………………….122 
BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………..133  
 
 
vii 
  
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
1. Table 1: Political Parties in the 1997 Polish Parliament………………...73 
2. Table 2: Four Main Candidates in the October 2000 Polish  
Presidential Election……………………………………………………………..77 
3. Table 3: Political Parties in the 2001 Polish Parliament…………………84 
4. Table 4: Political Parties in the 2005 Polish Parliament…………………87 
5. Table 5: The June 2003 Polish EU Accession Referendum……………..90 
6. Table 6: The June 2004 Polish Election to the European Parliament…...92 
7. Table 7: 1998 Chamber of Deputies Election Results…………………...98 
8. Table 8: 2002 Chamber of Deputies Election Results………………….104 
9. Table 9: 2006 Chamber of Deputies Election Results………………….112 
10. Table 10: The June 2003 EU Accession Referendum Results 
 in the Czech Republic………………………………………………………….117 
11. Table 11: The 2004 European Parliament Elections Turnout  
in the CEECs……………………………………………………………………120  
12. Table 12: Czech Political Parties Standing in the 2004 European 
Parliament Elections………………………………………………….121   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
  
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AWS                   Solidarity Electoral Action 
CEE                     Central and Eastern Europe 
CEECs                 Central and Eastern European Countries 
CSSD                    Czech Social Democratic Party 
ECT                      European Constitutional Treaty 
KSCM                  Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia 
LPR                      League of Polish Families  
ODS                     Civic Democratic Union 
PĠS                        Law and Justice 
PO                        Civic Platform 
PSL                      Polish Peasant Party 
Samoobrona         Self-Defence 
SLD                     Democratic Left Alliance 
UP                        Labour Union 
UW                       Freedom Union 
 
 
ix 
 1 
 
 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Euroscepticism is not a new, nor a threatening phenomenon in the history of 
European integration. From the famous 1988 Bruges Speech of Margaret Thatcher 
to Vaclav Klaus‟s speech to the European Parliament on 12 February 2009 at the 
beginning of the Czech EU Presidency, nothing much has really changed in terms 
of the source of opposition to European integration.  In both cases, Euroscepticism 
serves as an outright manifestation of the concerns and reservations of those who 
oppose further integration beyond economic cooperation, and the transformation 
of the EU into a supranational political entity. However, what has dramatically 
changed is that Euroscepticism can no longer be conceived of as a marginal 
political attitude towards European integration which can be described with 
reference to a singular “Thatcherite” rhetoric. “The Bruges Speech” by Margaret 
Thatcher was the first outright manifestation of a Eurosceptic political discourse, 
which expressed the concerns of those who oppose further integration beyond 
inter-state economic cooperation and the transformation of the Union into a 
supranational political entity.  
The politics of Euroscepticism and its discourse have become one of the defining 
characteristics of the European political landscape. As Leconte (2010: 12) 
describes: “what was considered a Eurosceptic discourse in the Thatcher era has 
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now become common parlance in relation to the EU.” Euroscepticism has always 
accompanied the development of European integration. Its size and salience 
grows as the scale of European integration becomes wider, bigger and deeper. In 
this sense, Euroscepticism has acquired importance more than ever as the Union 
has become a supranational political entity and reached its greatest size yet with 
twenty seven members. In light of these developments, the issues of Europe and 
European integration become the major themes of domestic political discussion 
and contestation.It is in this context that the salience of the politics of 
Euroscepticism dramatically increased in terms of its impact on party politics of 
member, new member and candidate states.    
It is no longer possible to assume the existence of a permissive consensus, which 
had been widely endorsed throughout the post war era, concerning the direction 
and nature of European integration at the political level. The end of the elite 
consensus on the limits and nature of European integration reached its peak with 
the controversies surrounding the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 
(Leconte, 2010: 45). Since the 1990s, the age of the „permissive consensus‟ about 
the European integration was started to be replaced by the age of a „constraining 
dissensus‟ (Steenbergen et al., 2007: 14). In this process, the national 
governments and political parties have become the central actors as the most 
direct channels of influence for the expression of public and party political 
Euroscepticism both at the national and EU levels. In all these respects, 
Euroscepticism has become “a corollary of increasing European integration” 
(Taggart, 1998: 363), and the increasing academic interest in the study of 
Europeanization of political parties, party politics and party-level Euroscepticism 
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owes its existence to the growing salience and impact of the issue of „Europe‟ and 
the EU on national political structures. 
According to Mair (2008: 154), there are three main research strands in the 
European integration and political parties literature.  First, the study of 
transnational party federations and their potential to create substantial party 
activity at the European level; secondly the study of the nature and dynamics of 
the parties and party systems in the European Parliament and finally the study of 
the impact and role of Europe in shaping party programs, party ideology, party 
systems and party competition at the national level. The present study belongs to 
third strand of research and seeks to contribute to the development of the literature 
on the Europeanization of political parties. It does so by focusing on the impact of 
European integration on domestic party politics. In doing so, it also recognizes the 
limits to which West European party based concepts and analytical tools can 
contribute to our understanding of the Europeanization of party systems and party 
politics in Central and Eastern Europe. It also highlights the necessity for the 
further development of the Europeanization framework, which can account for the 
differences between the Western and Eastern European party systems and their 
effects on the countries‟ respective extent of Europeanization. 
The study of party-based Euroscepticism in two countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe demonstrates the multifaceted nature of Euroscepticism. Euroscepticism is 
not conceived as a stable position and attitude towards the issues of Europe and 
European integration on the basis of a particular party political ideology. It 
features across the left-right political spectrum and cuts across the mainstream 
dimensions of political competition. This study further seeks to demonstrate that, 
in contrast to the rational institutionalist accounts of Europeanization, the politics 
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of Euroscepticism is not necessarily evident only in marginal political parties that 
are located at the fringes of their national party system. In terms of its concrete 
application, this study analyzes the political discourses, positions and attitudes of 
mainstream political parties, which manifest varying degrees Euroscepticism. In 
this vein, the chapters on Poland and the Czech Republic will show that 
Euroscepticism is not necessarily a feature of marginal party politics. 
Furthermore, through the comparative analysis of the politics of Euroscepticism in 
the Czech Republic and Poland, this study attempts to strengthen the argument 
that Euroscepticism has differential levels and functions in different national 
settings. The broad range of political parties and different Eurosceptic positions 
all point to  the fact that Euroscepticism has a multi-faceted nature.  
In light of all these, this study asks three major interrelated questions: First, how 
do mainstream political parties problematise the issue of Europe and European 
integration within their national party politics and discourse?  Secondly, why do 
mainstream political parties make use of a Eurosceptic political rhetoric? Thirdly, 
how can we account for different levels and forms of Euroscepticism employed by 
mainstream political parties?  
The organization of the chapters is as follows. After the introduction, the second 
chapter offers a detailed literature review on Europeanization. It also sets the 
theoretical framework used in this study. It does so by unpacking Europeanization 
both as an analytical concept and as a theoretical framework. It then proceeds to 
reveal the differences between “Europeanization West” vs. “Europeanization 
East” and locates the research design of this study within the latter category. The 
chapter then introduces the Europeanization of political parties literature as well 
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as the main research questions and concludes with a discussion on how political 
party Europeanization is, and should be, approached. 
The third chapter establishes the link between Europeanization and 
Euroscepticism, unpacks the concept of Euroscepticism and introduces 
methodological insights to the study of party-based Euroscepticism. It does so by 
presenting a detailed overview of earlier studies on general party attitudes towards 
European integration, paying attention to the differences between the Western and 
East European contexts. The chapter then moves from the study of party attitudes 
in general to the study of party-based Euroscepticism in particular in the context 
of Central and Eastern European countries. It introduces different 
conceptualizations of Euroscepticism and arrives at some conclusions explaining 
which definitions are operationalized in this study. 
The fourth chapter offers an empirical analysis of party-based Euroscepticism in 
Poland. The chapter begins by introducing the objectives of conducting an 
empirical analysis and proceeds by offering the main features of the Polish party 
system. Then follows an analysis of primary and second order elections in order to 
show how Europe plays a role in shaping national party politics, the structure of 
national party competition and correspondingly how mainstream political parties 
problematise Europeanization by looking at their election campaigns, manifestos 
and discourses.  
The fifth chapter analyzes the effects of Europeanization on Czech political 
parties and party system through examining the changes in party programs of the 
three major political parties (social democrats, communists and the centre-right). 
This chapter aims to provide a respective focus on Czech party system and 
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politics in the pre-accession and post-accession periods and to demonstrate that 
the politics of Euroscepticism can offer a viable ground for domestic party 
opposition. It can be utilized as a powerful party strategy for electoral 
competition, although the issue of Europe does not become a new political 
cleavage in the party systems of candidate and new member states at the domestic 
level.  
Finally, the concluding chapter brings Europeanization and the politics of 
Euroscepticism together in light of the study‟s theoretical and conceptual 
framework and main empirical findings. Thus the thesis concludes with an 
evaluation of the extent to which mainstream understandings of Europeanization 
can help our understanding of the relationship between European integration and 
party-based Euroscepticism in CEECs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 
EUROPEANIZATION AS A FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
2.1 A Review of the Literature on Europeanization 
 
This chapter will review the literature on Europeanization in order to demonstrate 
the contested nature of the concept of Europeanization, which generates much 
controversy concerning its precise definition and theoretical application within the 
field of European integration studies. The lack of a shared definition of the 
concept has been a source of severe criticism, and has been described as “a 
fashionable concept”, regarding its usefulness understanding European 
transformations (Olsen, 2002: 921). However, the multiplicity of its definitions 
and applications enriches the conceptualization of Europeanization, which leads to 
a distinctively broad research agenda for studies concerning the domestic politics 
of the European Union.  
Cini et al. (2007), acknowledge four commonly accepted definitions of 
Europeanization. The first definition adopts a top-down perspective which focuses 
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on the impacts of the European Union on the member states. The main object of 
analysis is the impact of EU level institutions, policies and policy-making at the 
national level. This approach is concerned with the changes and transformations 
in the national level of governance as a result of European integration. The second 
definition entails both a top-down and a bottom-up approach, which analyzes the 
interaction between policies, institutions and policy making at the EU and national 
levels. From this perspective, Europeanization is a two-dimensional process 
through which member states shape the EU level by uploading their own policies, 
institutions and policy-making. At the same time they are constantly shaped by 
the EU‟s influence through downloading EU policies and institutions into the 
domestic arena (Börzel, 2002: 193). The third definition offers a more horizontal 
approach to Europeanization whereby the changes in the institutions, policies and 
policy making in one member are exported to other member states without 
necessarily this being an outcome of involvement by EU institutions. Hence, the 
central focus is on the role played by institutions regarding policy transfer and 
policy-making from one member state to another. Finally the fourth definition 
views Europeanization as a process of institution-building and policy-making at 
the EU level. This classification of the different approaches to Europeanization 
carries a crucial task for the purposes of this study which will incorporate both a 
top-down and a bottom-up approach to Europeanization. Given the lack of 
conceptual precision in the literature, first it is necessary to trace the development 
of existing definitions so as to comprehend their meaning. Secondly, we ought to 
analyze them in light of the fourfold typology mentioned above to identify which 
definitions prove to be useful within the conceptual framework of this study.    
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Europeanization studies, which adopt a particular view of the concept as the 
impact of the EU on domestic politics, consist of a multitude of alternative 
definitions; yet share some degree of commonality in their analysis.  
Ladrech (1994: 69) defined Europeanization as “an incremental process 
reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and 
economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics 
and policy-making”. Radaelli (2000) considers this definition a significant 
advancement on the grounds that it views Europeanization primarily as an 
“incremental process”, which highlights the role played by the organizational 
logic of the member states. From Ladrech's (1994: 71) perspective, the re-
orientation of the national organization logic, described as “the adaptive processes 
of organizations to a changed or changing environment”, appears as an output of 
the Europeanization process. In this sense, Ladrech introduces a bottom-up 
approach to Europeanization, which prioritizes the role of domestic structures in 
the process of national adaptation.  
Although Ladrech (1994) points to the convergence effect of Europeanization by 
underlining the reorientation of the organizational logic of domestic structures, he 
underestimates the role played by individuals and policy entrepreneurs. 
Furthermore, Ladrech's definition was subject to criticism on the grounds that its 
scope of analysis was restricted to national politics and policy-making, whereas 
“one could add identities and the cognitive component of politics” (Radaelli, 
2000: 3). 
Bulmer and Burch (1998: 602) conceptualized Europeanization as: 
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The extent to which EC/EU requirements and policies have affected the    
determination of member states' policy agendas and goals' and 'the extent 
to which EU practices, operating procedures and administrative values 
have impinged on, and become embedded in, the administrative practices 
of the member states. 
 
Radaelli (2000) and Bache (2003) assert that the historical institutionalist 
perspective of Bulmer and Burch (1998) articulates the importance of how 
European integration was perceived and constructed in shaping Britain's 
adjustment process to the EU. To put it more clearly, rather than endorsing the 
idea of “a clash of administrative traditions”, their study advocates that the 
maintenance of pre-existing features of the “national governmental machinery” 
both mediated and facilitated the national adjustment process (Bache, 2003: 3; 
Radaelli, 2000: 7). In this framework, Europeanization takes place within the 
political realm whereby member states are capable of incorporating the prevailing 
administrative traditions to those of the EU.  In short, Europeanization is 
conceived as an outcome of an interactive process between the two separate levels 
of governance, national and European. 
Börzel (quoted in Radaelli, 2000:3) defines Europeanization as a “process by 
which domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to European policy-
making.” This definition draws on the transfer of power and competencies of the 
member states to the EU level of decision-making. Taking into account the 
criticisms concerning the reductionist understanding of Europeanization solely as 
change in policy and policy-making practices (Vink, 2002: 4), in a later study, 
Börzel (2002: 193) expands her previous conceptual definition as: 
Europeanization is a two-way process. It entails both a bottom-up and a top-
down dimension. The former emphasizes the evolution of European 
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institutions as a set of new norms, rules and practices, whereas the latter 
refers to the impact of these new institutions on political structures and 
processes of the member states. 
 
On the basis of the above, it is possible to claim that a broader and more useful 
definition of Europeanization, which highlights the “ways in which member state 
governments both shape European policy outcomes and adapt to them”, is 
introduced (Börzel, 2002: 195). This allows the researcher to include the interplay 
between the EU and domestic levels of governance in the analysis of the 
Europeanization process.  
Cowles et al. (2001), offer an alternative definition of Europeanization, which 
perfectly illustrates the fourth approach discussed within the fourfold distinction 
offered by Cini et al. They refer to the institution-building and policy-making 
processes at the EU level. Their definition is as follows (Cowles et al., 2001: 3): 
We define Europeanization as the emergence and development at the 
European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal 
and social institutions associated with political problem-solving that 
formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing 
in the creation of authoritative rules. Europeanization involves the evolution 
of new layers of politics that interact with older ones.  
 
In light of Börzel's distinction between bottom-up and top-down dimensions of 
Europeanization, it can be argued that although Cowles et al. (2001) view 
Europeanization as a two-way process and are cognizant of the interaction among 
different actors and policy networks from the national and EU levels, their 
definition is more heavily oriented towards a bottom-up approach. This is because 
the primary focus is on the evolution of European institutions as a set of new 
norms rules and practices as opposed to the feedbacks of this new institutional 
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building by the member states whose activities affect the European level. Another 
important remark to be made concerns the common element between Cowles et 
al. (2001) and other conceptualizations discussed above regarding the emphasis 
on the “domestic adaptation with national colors”, one of the most central themes 
within Cowles et al. (2001: 1) framework, which implies that “national features 
continue to play a role in shaping the outcomes” of Europeanization. A final point 
relates to the central contribution of their study, which explores the mechanisms 
of Europeanization in the attempt to explain “why, how and under what 
conditions Europeanization shapes a variety of domestic structures in a number of 
countries” in a differential way (Cowles et al. 2001: 3). Their volume introduces a 
three-step approach to Europeanization, which introduces “the goodness of fit” 
argument, the notion of adaptation pressures and mediating factors in the attempt 
to offer a framework of domestic adaptational change. According to their 
argument, the so- called goodness of fit (or misfit) between the EU rules and 
regulations and the domestic politics, the Europeanization process generates 
differential adaptational pressures on domestic structures of the member states, 
which might consequently lead to adaptational change depending on the “presence 
or absence of mediating factors” (Cowles et al., 2001:  9). Drawing upon this 
framework, Börzel and Risse (2003) identify domains of Europeanization as 
policies, politics and polities, along which the domestic impact of Europeanization 
can be analyzed. The reason behind this three-fold distinction is to provide an 
analytical framework through which the differential impact and asymmetrical 
character of Europeanization can be studied under the different domestic domains 
of member states.  
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In a similar attempt to identify the mechanisms of Europeanization, Olsen (cited 
in Cini et al., 2007: 409), indicates five dimensions to respond to the question of 
“how Europeanization as a process of change operates.”  The first dimension, 
which is defined as changes in the external boundaries, is concerned with the 
extent to which Europe as a territorial form of political organization acts as a 
single political space. In this perspective, Europeanization is conceptualized as a 
feedback effect of European enlargement. The second dimension uses 
Europeanization to denote a process of developing institutions at the European 
level. In addition, it emphasizes the institutionalization of a distinct form of 
governance, which provides a collective action capacity to the member states by 
facilitating the co-ordination and coherence between the EU and national levels of 
governance. The third dimension conceptualizes Europeanization as a process 
through which national and sub-national levels are adapted to the EU level of 
governance. The fourth dimension focuses on the export of the EU form of 
political organization and governance beyond the member states. This particular 
perspective is interested in finding out how Europe plays a role in terms of 
shaping and influencing the actors, institutions and systems of governance in the 
non-member states. The final dimension in Olsen's schema uses Europeanization 
to examine the extent to which a unified political entity sharing a common 
territory, the processes of institution building and domestic adaptation, and the 
transfer of EU-level policy and policy-making contribute to a political unification 
project.  
Finally on the basis of Ladrech‟s definition, Radaelli (2000: 3) formulates 
Europeanization as: 
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Processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of 
formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of 
doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and 
consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the 
logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public 
policies. 
 
Recalling the critique of Ladrech's conceptualization of Europeanization 
(Radaelli, 2000: 3), which underlines the neglect of the role of individuals and 
policy entrepreneurs, Radaelli (2000) fills the gap by paying considerable 
attention to informal rules, procedures, beliefs, discourse and identities as well as 
formal rules and practices. Contrary to the notion of a change solely in the 
organizational logic (Ladrech, 1994), Radaelli‟s definition underlines a change in 
the logic of political behavior too. In Radaelli‟s (2000: 3) words, a change in the 
logic of political behavior occurs “through a process leading to the 
institutionalization in the domestic political system of discourses, cognitive maps, 
normative frameworks and styles coming from the EU.” Another contrasting point 
with Ladrech's conceptualization is the equal attention paid to organizations and 
domestic actors, rather than prioritizing the former at the expense of neglecting 
the latter. According to Radaelli and Pasquier (2008: 38), domestic actors are “the 
filters and users of European norms and rules”, who can “re-appropriate European 
norms and policy paradigms to implement their own policies” and “draw on the 
EU as a resource without specific pressure from Brussels.”  
Another crucial point relates to a distinction between the first and second 
generations of Europeanization research claimed by Dyson and Goetz (2002). The 
second generation is characterized by a greater emphasis on politics, identities and 
interests, beliefs, values, ideas and “political dynamics” of misfit as opposed to 
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changes in policy and polity dimensions and the “assumed mismatch between 
European and domestic levels” (Bache, 2003: 6). In this sense, Radaelli's (2000) 
conceptualization illustrates the features of the second generation, which 
incorporates ideas, institutions and interests as evidently central elements. 
Although there can be contrasting elements in the conceptualizations of 
Europeanization, each of them complements a wider picture of the 
Europeanization literature, which is considered to be a “set of contested 
discourses and narratives about the impact of European integration on domestic 
change” (Radaelli and Pasquier, 2008: 35). Europeanization is “what political 
actors make of it” (Radaelli and Pasquier, 2008: 35). However, it is possible to 
identify common themes that are observable in all of its conceptualizations:  first, 
an emphasis on the distinction between European integration and 
Europeanization, which implies that the two are not synonymous.  Second, the 
impact of Europe differs trans-nationally, trans-historically and even among 
different dimensions- policy, politics and polity-within a country.  Finally, the 
recognition of differential adaptational pressures and responses emanating from 
the member states can be listed as shared domains of agreement within 
Europeanization studies. Similarly to the existence of a plurality of approaches, 
the term Europeanization can hardly be used to denote a common field of research 
and a unified research agenda.  
In response, Cini et al. (2007) identifies three domains of Europeanization 
research: Europeanization of (1) member state institutions, (2) policies, and (3) 
national politics meaning party politics, party systems and structures of political 
representation. When it comes to locating Europeanization within the study of 
European integration, it goes without saying that Europeanization studies had a 
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profound effect on integration studies in terms of raising the issues that had 
previously remained untouched. Particularly the implementation of European 
policies in the member states gained particular importance. Furthermore, several 
domains of national politics such as political parties (Ladrech, 2002), party 
systems (Mair, 2000) and citizenship (Checkel, 2001) that had been given less 
attention within integration studies gained an increasing empirical focus.  
Finally, given the purposes of this study the most important advancement 
concerning the content of the research agenda is its expansion of the 
Europeanization framework to include candidate states, particularly in Central and 
Eastern Europe (Vink, 2002: 4). Indeed, the Europeanization of candidate 
countries, which originally emerged in the context of Eastern enlargement, is 
considered to be a particular sub-field of a broader research agenda called 
“Europeanization East” (Heritier, 2005) within Europeanization research. At this 
stage, it is necessary to unpack the concept “Europeanization East” and present its 
defining features in comparison with the “Europeanization West” literature.  
2.1.1 Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe 
The impact of the EU has been the most influential, comprehensive and explicit in 
the case of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries (Sedelmeier, 2006: 4), 
where the legacy of communism in the social, political and economic domains 
created additional adjustment costs and requirements on the road to membership. 
The introduction of political and social conditionality besides the obligation of 
adopting the acquis communitaire resulted into a comprehensive transformation 
of the domestic politics and policy regimes of CEE countries and completely 
differentiated their Europeanization process from the Europeanization of Western 
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member states (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002). Thus, the literature on the 
Europeanization of candidate states “as a distinctive research area” emerged in the 
context of Eastern enlargement (Sedelmeier, 2006: 6). In this respect, the study of 
the unique experiences of CEE candidate countries provides a rich empirical 
material, which further expands the scope of the Europeanization literature 
(Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005: 5).  
In the attempt to conceptualize the Europeanization of Central and Eastern 
Europe, Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2005) define Europeanization 
primarily as a process in which states adopt EU rules. Within the framework of 
Europeanization East, the existence of EU rules and regulations is the independent 
variable, whereas rule adoption is the dependent one. In their top-down 
understanding of Europeanization, which focuses on the institutionalization of EU 
rules at the domestic level, they identify three different forms of rule adoption and 
the mechanisms through which candidate states adopt EU rules, norms and 
regulations from the perspective of institutional theory.  
According to their framework, candidate states can follow three different forms of 
rule adoption which are the formal, the behavioral, and the discursive conception. 
According to the formal conception, the adoption consists of the transposition of 
EU rules into national law or in the establishment of formal institutions and 
procedures in line with the EU rules. According to the behavioral conception, 
adoption is measured by the extent to which behavior is rule conforming. On the 
contrary, the discursive conception of norms suggests that “adoption is indicated 
by the incorporation of a rule as a positive reference into discourse among 
domestic actors” (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005: 8). In the absence of 
such an incorporation of a particular EU norm, a situation may arise on the 
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political scene in which domestic actors instrumentalize the discourse of rule 
adoption simply for the sake of “rhetorical action”.  
Regarding the mechanisms of rule adoption, Sedelmeier and Schimmelfenning 
(2005) propose two different logics of action; the logic of consequence and the 
logic of appropriateness, which are drawn from the distinction between rational 
and sociological institutionalism. Rationalist institutionalism treats actors as 
rational and goal oriented, who engage in strategic interactions using their 
resources to maximize their utilities on the basis of given, fixed and ordered 
preferences by following an instrumental rationality. From this perspective 
Europeanization is largely conceived of as an emerging political opportunity 
structure which offers some actors additional resources to exert influence, while 
severely constraining the ability of others to pursue their goals.  
On the other hand, sociological institutionalism emphasizes that actors are guided 
by collective understandings of what constitutes proper, that is, socially 
acceptable behavior in a given rule structure. These collective understandings and 
inter-subjective meanings influence the ways in which actors define their goals 
and what they perceive as “rational” actions. Rather than maximizing their 
subjective desires, actors strive to fulfill social expectations. From this perspective 
Europeanization is understood as the emergence of new rules, norms, practices 
and structures of meaning to which member states are exposed and which they 
have to incorporate into their domestic practices and structures. In contrast to the 
rationalist assumption, the sociological perspective emphasizes arguing, learning, 
and socialization as the main mechanisms by which new norms and identities 
emanating from Europeanization processes are internalized by domestic actors 
and lead to new definitions of interest and of collective identities. Although the 
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rational and sociological perspectives entail sharply contrasting features, 
Sedelmeier and Schimmelfenning (2005) strongly endorse the idea that the two 
logics of change are not mutually exclusive and they often operate simultaneously 
or dominate different phases of the adaptational process.   
Another important point concerning Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier‟s (2005) 
conceptualization of Europeanization of the CEE is the three different models of 
rule adoption: first, the external incentives model; secondly the social learning 
model, and finally the lesson drawing model. The classification of these models 
depends on two main criteria. First, whether the principal actor is defined as the 
EU or the CEE. In other words, whether the import of EU rules is EU –driven or 
CEE driven. Second, whether the logic of rule adoption follows logic of 
consequences or logic of appropriateness. On the basis of this schema, the 
external incentives model appears as an outcome of the intersection between the 
EU as a principal actor and logic of consequences as the adopted logic of rule 
adoption. This model is “a rationalist bargaining model” (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2005: 10), which is based on the asymmetrical distribution of 
bargaining power between different actors. The relative bargaining powers of the 
actors determine the outcomes of the bargaining process. In this context, the 
external incentives model views the adoption of EU rules as the main condition 
that “the CEEs have to fulfill in order to receive the rewards from the EU” 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 10). Scholars argue that within the 
external incentives model, conditionality may directly impact the target 
government, through an intergovernmental bargaining process, which calculates 
whether the domestic adjustment costs of adopting the EU rule does or does not 
outweigh the benefits of the promised EU rewards.  Alternatively, conditionality 
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may work indirectly, through the differential empowerment of domestic actors, 
which creates additional incentives for some domestic actors “to utilize EU rules 
in solving certain policy problems”. Thus the process empowers those actors, who 
previously “did not have sufficient power to impose their preferred rules” in the 
political system (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 11). As a result, the use 
of conditionality upsets the previous domestic opportunity structure “in favor of 
those domestic actors, whose bargaining power has been strengthened vis-a-vis 
their opponents in society and government” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 
2005: 12). A final remark concerns the four factors upon which an effective policy 
of EU conditionality depends: (1) the determinacy of conditions, (2) the size and 
speed of rewards, (3) the credibility of conditionality, and (4) veto players and 
adoption costs.  
In contrast to a rationalist understanding of conditionality, the social learning and 
lesson drawing models are derived from the logic of appropriateness, yet they 
differ in terms of their principal actors. In the social learning model, the principal 
actor is the EU, whereas in the lesson drawing model it is the CEE. From the 
perspective of the social learning model “whether a non-member state adopts EU 
rules depends on the degree to which it regards EU rules and its demands for rule 
adoption as appropriate in terms of collective identity, values and norms” 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 18). In this model three factors, which 
empower EU conditionality, are identified: (1) the legitimacy of rules and process, 
(2) identity, and (3) resonance. Alternatively, non-member states may adopt EU 
rules independently from an EU policy demand. This situation is described as 
policy transfer, “in which knowledge of EU rules is used in the development of 
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rules in the political systems of the CEECs” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 
2005: 20).   
Regarding the discussion on the differences of the Europeanization process 
depending on the Eastern and Western context, Heritier (2005) puts forward the 
basic features of the literature on Europeanization West. First, this involves three 
major theoretical strands: (1) rational institutionalism, (2) historical 
institutionalism and (3) sociological institutionalism. Secondly, in addition to 
institutionalisms, several analytical factors are assumed as the explanatory 
variables for the analysis of the outputs of Europeanization West. The first factor 
is the assumption of “identical EU policy demands and pressure for all countries 
under investigation”. The second is the assumption of rational strategic actors”. 
The third is the study of the prevailing domestic policy and policy-making 
practices through the lenses of a goodness of fit approach. The fourth is the 
conceptualization of the national administrative, institutional and political 
structures within the context of veto players and finally the proposition that 
“national colors” behind the policy practices of the member states determine their 
“distinctiveness or similarity to EU policy demands” (Heritier, 2005: 201). On the 
other hand, regarding the ways in which the outcomes of Europeanization are 
studied, research on  Europeanization West has mainly focused on the policy level 
outcomes in terms of “short-term implementation” or “mid-and long-term 
behavioral adjustments” (Heritier, 2005: 201). Policy transformations are viewed 
as patterns of change which are measured in terms of “absorption, patching-up, 
substitution and innovation”. Finally the central question in the Europeanization 
West research agenda appears as (Heritier, 2005: 201): 
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How EU policy demands, by creating new needs for administrative 
processes and organizational measures or by favoring some national 
political actors over others have brought about changes in existing 
administrative and political structures and processes.  
 
On the other side of the spectrum, “Europeanization East” substantially differs 
from “West” in terms of their point of departure. To begin with, the 
Europeanization process in CEE countries coincides with their transition to 
democracy and market economies. Moreover, Europeanization East begins under 
the “shadow” of the accession negotiations, which exerts high pressures on the 
candidate states due to conditionality. Under these circumstances, the research 
agenda of “Europenization East” literature has reached a wider scope compared to 
its Western counterpart. In contrast to the restricted focus of “Europeanization 
research West” on narrow policy issues, the changes in policies and policy-
making in Europeanization East is viewed within the context of the 
implementation of the overall acquis. Another point concerns the effects of EU 
policy demands, which require substantial changes in national political, 
administrative and judicial structures. In contrast to such type of EU policy 
demands in the Western context, institutional reform is almost a by-product of any 
policy requirement directed at the CEEs by the EU (Heritier, 2005: 206).  
The final but most crucial point to be made concerns the character of the 
Europeanization process that the member states and candidate states in the CEE 
went through. “Europenization West” is accepted as a “two-way street” whereby 
member states shape EU level policies and policy-making by uploading their own 
policy measures and preferences. However, on the basis of the fact that the 
Europeanization of the CEEs starts with the accession process, the CEECs lack 
the capability to actively shape the EU policy measures. Thereby, 
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“Europeanization East” is considered to be a one-way street of influence (Heritier, 
2005: 207).  
 In a similar vein, Grabbe (2002) puts forward three factors which substantially 
differentiate the experiences of Europeanization of the CEECs from 
Europeanization West. The first factor is „the speed of adjustment‟. According to 
Grabbe (2002: 4) “the formal accession process sets out to adopt CEE institutions 
and policies to the EU much faster and more thoroughly than the adaptation of 
current EU-15 members”. The second factor is the wide openness of the CEECs to 
EU influence. The process of post-communist transformation generated less 
institutional resistance to EU policies in comparison to the Western member 
states. The third factor is “the breadth of the EU‟s agenda in CEE”, which refers 
to the commitment of the applicant countries of the CEE to adopt “a maximalist 
version of the EU‟s policies”, without necessarily offering the “possibility of opt-
outs from parts of the agenda” (Grabbe, 2002: 4).  
 
2.2 Political Parties and Europeanization 
 
2.2.1 Evolution of Modern Political Parties 
 
Giovanni Sartori (2005) starts his extensive discussion on the concept and 
rationale of the political party in his hallmark volume, Parties and Party Systems: 
a framework for analysis, by unpacking the etymological roots of the term „party‟. 
The central focus in Sartori's analysis is the transition from the word „faction‟ to 
'party' in the domains of both ideas and facts. Etymologically speaking, the term 
party derives from the Latin verb „partire‟ meaning „to divide‟, which did not have 
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a political meaning until the eighteenth century when the term entered the political 
discourse. In 1770 Edmund Burke offered one of the most quoted definitions of a 
political party: “Party is a body of men united, for promoting by their joint 
endeavors the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are 
all agreed” (Burke cited in Sartori, 2005: 8). 
According to Burke, political parties are “the proper means” to “carry their 
common plans into execution, with all the power and authority of the State”. In 
his framework, parties are the real agents of governance which consist of a “group 
of parliamentary representatives who agreed to cooperate upon a certain 
principle” (Burke cited in Krouwel, 2006: 250). 
Anthony Downs‟ (1957) definition of a political party is similar to Burke‟s in 
terms of emphasizing the legitimacy of the executive function of political parties 
and their view of political parties as „coalitions‟, which are central organizing 
features of politics (Downs cited in White, 2006: 6). 
In the broadest sense a political party is a coalition of men seeking 
to control the governing apparatus by legal means. By coalition, we 
mean a group of individuals who have certain ends in common and 
cooperate with each other to achieve them. By governing 
apparatus, we mean the physical, legal and institutional equipment 
which the government uses to carry out its specialized role in the 
division of labor. By legal means we mean either duly constituted 
or legitimate influence.  
 
An alternative definition of a political party is proposed by Robert Huckshorn 
(Huckshorn cited in White, 2006: 5), in his textbook entitled Political Parties in 
America. It follows a pragmatic line of thought in terms of explaining the raison 
d’etat of political parties:  
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A political party is an autonomous group of citizens having the 
purpose of making nominations and contesting elections in hope of 
gaining control over governmental power through the capture of 
public offices and the organization of the government. 
 
Acording to this view, political parties are the necessary means to direct 
government actions, whose main purpose is to win elections. In contrast to this 
view, Sartori (2005) argues that while political parties have representative and 
expressive functions that are both essential to their existence, it is the latter which 
is the most qualified feature of political parties.  
On the basis of this argument, Sartori (2005) defines three elements of a political 
party based on its expressive functions as follows: (1) parties are not factions, (2) 
a party is part of a whole, and (3) parties are channels of expression. 
According to Sartori (2005), a political party is different from a faction on the 
grounds that it links people to a government. It is a part of a “pluralistic whole”, 
which implies that a political party exists within a party system and is 
characterized by its capacity to govern for the pursuit of public interest; for “the 
sake of the whole”. Finally political parties are understood as “channels for 
articulating, communicating and implementing the demands of the governed” 
(Sartori, 2005: 24). The expressive function of political parties is fundamental to 
their performance as means of communication. In conclusion, the role of political 
parties in terms of their two major functions: channeling and expressing mass 
preferences and demands is more fundamental than their representative function. 
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2.2.2 The Classification of Party Models 
The literature consists of a variety of party models based on different dimensions 
that aim to explain the genesis, development and transformation of political 
parties. Some scholars acknowledge that the majority of party models are 
characterized by a one-dimensional approach, exclusively based on the 
organizational aspects of political parties (Duverger, 1954; Krouwel, 2006).  The 
lack of the study of multiple dimensions results into a narrow understanding of 
party models, which neglects the multilayered functions of political parties. 
Gunther and Diamond (2003) refer to the problem as “a lack of conceptual and 
terminological clarity and precision” in the literature as a consequence of the 
multiplicity of party models. To address this problem, five generic definitions of 
party models will be introduced.  
The first modern political parties emerged before the introduction of the mass 
suffrage in the late 19th century (Scarrow, 2006: 16). The first modern parties are 
described in the literature as “elite, caucus and cadre parties” that are “led by 
prominent individuals, organized in closed caucuses which have minimal 
organization outside the parliament” (Krouwel, 2006: 250). Sartori (2005: 17) 
describes the first political parties in eighteenth century Britain as “aristocratic, in-
group, parliamentary” parties which were formed in “a very loose sense” of an 
existing parliamentary system. The second party model covers the mass parties 
whose fundamental features are “extra-parliamentary mass mobilization of 
politically excluded social groups on the basis of well articulated organizational 
structures and ideologies” (Krouwel, 2006: 250).  
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The third party model is called the “catch-all” parties which “originate from mass 
parties that have professionalized their party organization and downgraded their 
ideological profile in order to appeal to a wider electorate than their original class 
or religious social base” (Krouwel, 2006: 250). Kirchheimer (1954) was the first 
to introduce the concept of the catch-all party. According to Kirchheimer (cited in 
Krouwel, 2006: 256), the transition from the mass party to catch-all party type 
was a result of the emergence of a substantial new middle class consisting of 
“skilled manual workers, white-collar workers and civil servants” whose interests 
“converged and became indistinguishable.” According to Kirchheimer‟s 
framework, a decrease in social polarization among different classes “went hand 
in hand” -to quote Krouwel (2006: 256)-with a decrease in political polarization 
among different mass political parties, which rendered their differing ideological 
doctrines interchangeable. Thereby, a reduction of the “party‟s ideological 
baggage” and of “politics to the mere management” of the state is a defining 
element in the conceptualization of the catch-all party.  
The fourth party model is the cartel party defined as “the fusion of the party in 
public office with several interest groups that form a political cartel, which is 
mainly oriented towards the maintenance of executive power” (Krouwel, 2006: 
256).  Katz and Mair (1995: 5) propose a definition from a state-party cartel 
approach as “colluding parties that become agents of the state and employ the 
resources of the state to ensure their own collective survival”.  
The final party model is the business-firm party which is characterized by a 
flexible ideological orientation and replacement of social objectives with policy 
products. In a business-firm party, the policy positions emerge neither from an 
ideological stance nor from social objectives. They are developed rather “on the 
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basis of „market research‟ with focus groups, survey research and local trials to 
test their feasibility and popularity” (Krouwel, 2006: 261). 
In addition to the presentation of party models, it is necessary to offer how 
mainstream and marginal political parties are conceptualized. Mainstream parties 
can be conceptualized “in terms of votes, left/right position, or government 
participation” (Marks et al., 2002: 588). Accordingly, this study conceptualizes 
mainstream parties as those parties, which gain sufficient amount of votes to enter 
the parliament. Secondly, those parties, which participate in the government or 
have the chance of participating, are classified as mainstream parties. On the other 
hand, those parties, which fail to enter the parliament and do not have the chance 
of participating in the government, are conceptualized as marginal political 
parties. 
2.3 The Europeanization of Political Parties Literature   
In the literature that addresses the relationship between European integration and 
political parties, Mair (2008) identifies three main strands of research. The first 
strand studies the formation of transnational party federations and their potential 
to create substantial party activity at the European level (Ladrech, 2001: 390; 
Mair, 2008:154). The second strand focuses on the nature and dynamics of the 
parties and party systems in the European Parliament. The third strand of research 
is the most recent, studying the impact and role of Europe in shaping party 
programs, party ideology, party systems and party competition at the national 
level (Mair, 2008: 154).  From this approach national political parties are viewed 
as key actors which can influence “the nature and direction” of the 
Europeanization of domestic politics and policy-making (Ladrech, 2001: 390). 
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The central research questions in the party Europeanization literature are 
concerned with the extent to which the process of European integration creates 
opportunities or poses difficulties for national actors, the politics of 
Euroscepticism, and the extent to which „Europe‟ plays a role in national political 
parties and party systems (Mair, 2008: 155).  
According to Mair (2008: 156), the Europeanization of party politics at the 
national level operates through two different mechanisms. The first mechanism, 
derived from Cowles et al. (2001) definition of Europeanization, is “the 
institutionalization of a distinct European political system.” In contrast to the 
bottom-up approach of the former, the second mechanism, which views 
Europeanization as an external and independent factor, adopts a top-down 
understanding, as in “the penetration of European rules, directives and norms into 
the domestic sphere” (Mair, 2008: 156). The second step in this framework is to 
classify the impact of Europeanization on national political party politics into two 
categories: (1) direct, and (2) indirect. From this two-dimensional typology, four 
outcomes are derived. To begin with, European norms may directly penetrate into 
the domestic arena which will lead to the formation of new anti-European parties 
or factions within existing political parties (Mair, 2008: 157). The second 
outcome is Europeanization as penetration with an indirect impact, which leads to 
an alteration of national party competition and a devaluation of national electoral 
competition (Mair, 2008: 158). The third outcome is Europeanization as 
institutionalization with a direct impact on national party politics, which results 
into the formation and consolidation of pan-European party coalitions (Mair, 
2008: 159). Finally, Europeanization as institutionalization with an indirect 
impact is the fourth outcome, which results into the creation of non-partisan 
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channels of representation (Mair, 2008: 161). These four outcomes are described 
as the direct effects of Europeanization on political parties and party systems. For 
the purposes of this study the indirect effects of Europeanization on party systems 
and political parties will be examined.  
Following Mair‟s argument that indirect effects of Europeanization lead to more 
profound and decisive changes in the party systems of individual member states, 
the focus of analysis is on the relation between Europe and the patterns of political 
competition at the domestic level. Mair (2008: 159) identifies three distinct 
processes through which the development of a European level of policy making 
leads to “the „hollowing out‟ of policy competition between political parties at the 
national level.” Firstly, Europe limits the policy space that is available to 
competing parties. The development of a European level of policy making results 
into a situation in which national governments and parties face a more or less 
forced convergence in the development of their policies and decision-making. 
This process is described by Mair (2008: 159) as follows: 
National governments and the parties in those governments may still differ 
in how they interpret these demands for convergence, and in this sense 
there may still remain a degree of variation from one system to the next. 
When one of the member states does seek to opt out of a particular policy, 
this usually happens by agreement between government and opposition, 
and hence the policy remains foreshortened and the issue in question rarely 
becomes politicized. 
 
Secondly, it is argued that Europeanization limits the capacity of national 
governments and hence the political parties in those governments by “reducing 
the range of policy instruments at their disposal” (Mair, 2008: 159).  
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Finally, Europeanization “reduces the ability of parties in national governments to 
compete by limiting their policy repertoire” (Mair, 2008: 160). In light of all these 
Mair (2008: 160) posits that Europe indirectly leads to de-politicization of 
national party competition. However, this study aims to demonstrate that 
empirical data from Central and Eastern Europe does not necessarily confirm this. 
As the chapters on Poland and the Czech Republic will show, the Europeanization 
of political parties is not restricted to a limitation of national governments and 
political parties‟ capacity for mobilizing mass opinion on their political agenda. In 
this sense, although it is an undisputable fact that Europeanization generates a 
certain level of convergence, political parties as both institutional and social actors 
differ in the ways in which they construct and filter the issue of Europe. Thereby, 
the political actors‟ different ways of incorporating the European norms into “the 
logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies” 
(Radaelli, 2000:3) becomes a significant source for the politicization of EU 
related policy issues in particular, and the issue of Europe in general. 
On the other hand, to highlight the process through which  political parties adapt 
to the pressures of Europeanization through re-constructing and re-shaping their 
political identities around the issue of Europe and European integration, this study 
adopts Robert Ladrech‟s framework on the Europeanization of political parties. 
According to Ladrech (2002: 396-400), although the Europeanization process 
does not necessarily accomodate all political parties, it is possible to delienate five 
interrelated areas in which the evidence of political party Europeanization are 
most evident. The first area entails the analysis of programmatic changes of 
political parties. The focus of this is on analysing the extent to which the issues of 
Europe and European integration affect the modification of party programs. The 
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second area relates to organizational change, which refers to the transformation of 
the statutes and organizational models of party functions so as to take account of 
the European level of representation. The third area relates to the analysis of 
patterns of party competition, which explores the extent to which the issue of 
European integration becomes a relevant domestic issue with the capacity to 
effectively determine the major themes of domestic party competition and 
potentially to become a new cleavage in domestic party systems. The fourth area 
concerns the analysis of party- governmet relations, which primarily focuses on 
the effects of the participation of government officials in the European forums on 
the domestic parties‟ positions and attitudes on certain issues. The final area 
examines the extent of Europeanization of political parties by looking at the 
transnational cooperation between the supranational parties in the European 
Parliament and national parties of the individual member states.  
Ladrech‟s differentiation of five distinct areas facilitates our analysis of the 
Europeanization of political parties in Poland and Czceh Republic. However, it 
needs to be underlined that a comprehensive analysis of Europeanization of 
political parties on the basis of all of the aforementioned areas is not the aim of 
this study and hence the scope of our analysis necessitates a restricted focus on 
particular dimensions. Hence, the empirical analysis of this study will focus on the 
first and third areas. In other words,  the analysis aims to manifest the extent to 
which there is evidence of Europeanization of party programs, and whether the 
issues of Europe and European integration become a major theme of political 
competition. This carries the potential to determine the patterns of domestic party 
competition in the context of Central and Eastern Europe. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE POLITICS OF 
EUROSCEPTICISM 
 
 
 
The European Community is a practical means by which Europe can ensure the 
future prosperity and security of its people in a world in which there are many 
other powerful nations and groups of nations…Working more closely together 
does not require power to be centralized in Brussels or decisions to be taken by 
an appointed bureaucracy…We do not want a European super-state exercising a 
new dominance from Brussels…Our aim should not be more and more detailed 
regulation from the centre: it should be to deregulate. 
Margaret Thatcher, “The Bruges Speech”, 22 
September1988. 
  
Margaret Thatcher‟s famous speech to the College of Europe was an outright 
manifestation of a radical Eurosceptic discourse which stimulated an extensive 
debate between the competing views of supranationalism and 
intergovernmentalism within the political landscape of the European Community 
concerning the nature and direction of European integration. “The Bruges 
Speech” gains additional significance when it is read in light of the impact of the 
Single European Act (SEA) signed in 1986. The main objective of the SEA, 
which „incorporated into the Rome Treaty the concept of cooperation in economic 
and monetary policy‟ (Tsarouhas, 2006: 94), was to complete the common market 
by eliminating non-tariff barriers to free trade and thereby create the internal 
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market. Furthermore, it introduced the extension of the QMV in the Council of 
Ministers, enlarged the scope of the EEC‟s powers in policy areas -such as 
regional cohesion, health and safety at work and environmental protection, and 
enhanced the role of the Commission, „implied by the ambitious goal of 
completing the common market‟ (Leconte, 2010: 45). As a consequence of all 
these new major institutional arrangements, the SEA stimulated an intense debate 
concerning the limits of European integration on the basis of two main issues: first 
the extent to which the internal market should be regulated, and secondly the 
transformation of the EEC into a political union.  
In this respect, the signing of the SEA is considered to “mark the beginning of the 
end of the pro-integration consensus among national political elites”, which was 
won during the 1960s and 1970s (Leconte, 2010: 45).  In this respect, “the Bruges 
Speech” by Thatcher represents the most radical manifestation of the division 
within the elite of the former consensus regarding the nature, direction and 
objectives of European integration. As can be seen in the passage of the Bruges 
Speech quoted above, the concerns of those who opposed further integration 
beyond the SEA and the transformation of the EEC into a political union were 
spelled out by use of a Eurosceptic political discourse. Moreover, the Bruges 
Speech defined the cornerstone of a Eurosceptic discourse in the form of non- 
acceptance of the sui generis character of the EU as a union „of states and 
citizens‟ as opposed to mere interstate cooperation (Leconte, 2010: 8). Since the 
1990s, the age of the „permissive consensus‟ about European integration started to 
be replaced by the age of a „constraining dissensus‟ (Steenbergen et al., 2007: 14). 
In this process, national governments and political parties have become central 
actors as the most direct channels of influence for the expression of public and 
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political Euroscepticism both at the national and EU levels. In all these respects, 
Euroscepticism has become “a corollary of increasing European integration” 
(Taggart, 1998: 363), and increasing academic interest in the study of 
Europeanization of political parties, party politics and party-level Euroscepticism 
owes its existence to the growing salience and impact of the issue of „Europe‟ and 
the EU on national political structures. 
On the basis of Radaelli‟s (2003) definition of Europeanization mentioned in the 
previous chapter, it is possible to approach party-level Euroscepticism from a 
prism which displays how the rules, procedures, norms, shared beliefs and „ways 
of doing things‟ at the European level are perceived, filtered and diffused within 
national politics. In this respect, party-level Euroscepticism is not only a political 
response to the EU and European integration, but can also be interpreted as a 
domestic lens through which the issue of Europe is constructed and manipulated 
by political parties either for the purpose of shaping the policies, institutions and 
governance at the EU level or the structure of political party competition at the 
national level.  
Thus, Euroscepticism is understood as a multi-faceted phenomenon. It is not only 
a direct effect of Europeanization on national parties and party systems, but is also 
a significant independent variable. As such, it impacts upon political parties by 
restricting the arena in which political competition is played out and limits 
political actors‟ decision-taking by limiting the range of policies that political 
parties can implement (Cini et al., 2007: 417). 
In all these respects, Euroscepticism requires both a conceptual/ theoretical and an 
empirical analysis in order to reveal its multi-faceted nature and to understand 
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how it functions differently in different national settings. In order to achieve this 
aim, this chapter offers a conceptual analysis of Euroscepticism, which will be 
discussed within a broader comparative framework of party attitudes to European 
integration. The review of the study of party attitudes to European integration in 
Western and Eastern contexts reveals significant preliminary insights as to the 
distinctive nature of party-based Euroscepticism in CEE, which will be subject to 
an empirical analysis in the following chapters. Nevertheless, within the scope of 
this chapter, a literature review of Euroscepticism and party attitudes toward 
European integration in Western and Eastern context will be offered. This will be 
followed by a similar section on Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Finally, the chapter will conclude by discussing how this study attempts to 
understand party-based Euroscepticism. 
3.1 Euroscepticism and Party Attitudes toward European Integration in 
Western Europe 
Taggart (1998) illustrates the first systematic study of party –based 
Euroscepticism at the domestic level by providing an overview of party based 
Euroscepticism in Western Europe. Secondly, he analyses Euroscepticism in 
relation to party ideology and positions within their party systems. Taggart‟s 
fundamental contribution is to introduce a conceptual definition of Euroscepticism 
within the scholarly literature apart from its popular usage. Euroscepticism is 
defined as “the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating 
outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration” 
(Taggart, 1998: 366).  
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Furthermore, Taggart argues that Euroscepticism entails three different positions 
towards the European Union. First of all, there is an anti-integration position of 
party elites who oppose European integration in ideational terms and hence 
oppose EU membership and integration. A second position refers to those that do 
not oppose the idea of European integration, but are skeptical that the EU is the 
best form of integration because it is perceived to be too „inclusive‟, which 
implies that “the EU is trying to force together elements that are too diverse to be 
compatible” (Taggart, 1998: 366). Finally, the third position relates to those who 
do not oppose the idea of European integration, but retain their skepticism 
towards the EU as the best mechanism of integration as similar to the former 
position. This last position problematizes the EU on the grounds that it is 
conceived as too exclusive. In contrast to the second position, those actors who 
argue against the EU as the best form of integration express a sense of exclusion, 
which can be based on either geographical or social grounds.  
A second crucial contribution to the study of party based Euroscepticism is the 
classification of national political parties according to different forms of 
manifesting their opposition. The fundamental logic behind this classification is 
the idea that political parties manifest Euroscepticism in different ways with 
different objectives. On the basis of this logic, Taggart argues that there are four 
different ways in which Euroscepticism can be manifest in political parties. The 
first type of opposition comes from “single issue” Eurosceptic parties who are 
founded on the principle of opposition to the European Union. Their sole 
objective is to politicize the European issue and mobilize electors by holding on to 
Euroscepticism. In addition ad hoc coalitions that unite anti-EU movements in the 
face of an EU related „galvanizing event‟, such as the June Movement in Sweden, 
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People‟s Movement and Against EC-Union Movement in Denmark, are included 
in this category (Taggart, 1998: 369). Secondly, there are protest based parties 
with Euroscepticism whose raison d’etre is to protest the functioning of political 
systems and adopt an anti-EU position alongside their general opposition to the 
existing system of political representation. In Taggart‟s (1998: 368) words: 
Protest parties are defined as parties whose appeal stems either 
partly or wholly from being parties that both reject and stand 
outside the established group of (usually governmental) parties. 
Some parties make a virtue of their exclusion while others strive to 
play down their exclusion. 
 
Different terms such as „anti-establishment parties‟ or „discontent parties‟ have 
been applied to express the same phenomena that protest parties‟ defining element 
is their distance from the incumbent parties, while they may have completely 
different ideological affiliations. The French Communist Party and Greek 
Communist Party are examples of such parties. The third type of party that 
manifests Euroscepticism is an established party which adopts a Eurosceptical 
position on the grounds of either strategy for political contestation or ideological 
reasons. In other words, these are the mainstream parties “that have attempted to 
promote themselves as worthy of support because of their proximity to the 
governmental parties” (Taggart, 1998: 368). The most widely known examples in 
this category are the Centre Party in Norway, the Centre Democrats in Portugal, 
the Left Party in Sweden and the Democratic Unionist Party in UK. The final 
form of opposition comes from Eurosceptic factions of existing parties. In this 
form, Euroscepticism is expressed by a faction of an existing party which 
expresses support for European integration. However it is strongly emphasized 
that it is possible to talk about the existence of Eurosceptic factions to the extent 
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that factionalism can be observable within a party as „an organized activity of a 
group of individuals with a collective identity and a shared agenda‟ (Taggart, 
1998: 373). From this perspective, this form of Eurosceptic factionalism is 
claimed to exist in governing parties. The Eurosceptical wing of the British 
Conservative Party is an obvious example of this type.  
In comparison with the Euroscepticism of marginal parties, it is argued that 
Eurosceptical factionalism within major governing parties is viewed as a 
substantial cost to the party as it threatens the unity of the party‟s official stance 
and “the degree of certainty that electors can have about parties” trajectories and 
is therefore something that governing parties try to avoid (Taggart, 1998: 373). On 
the other hand, adopting a Eurosceptical line by marginal parties is seen as 
strategically advantageous to the party‟s overall scepticism towards existing 
domestic political structures. In this sense, marginal parties can instrumentalize 
Euroscepticism successfully as long as this contributes to mobilizing electoral 
support. The final crucial point regarding Taggart‟s analysis of party based 
Euroscepticism is the emphasis on the ideological diversity of Euroscepticism. 
Accordingly, locating political parties within their party families such as 
Conservative, Christian Democratic/ conservative parties, social democratic/ 
socialist parties and liberal parties, does not predetermine whether those parties 
will be Eurosceptical or not. In a similar vein, Featherstone (1988: 307) argues in 
his study on Socialist parties‟ attitudes towards European integration that “there 
has been no clear, consistent, cross-national correlation between left/right 
attitudes and policy towards European integration.”  
Marks et al., (2002), analyze national party attitudes to European integration 
without referring to the concept of Euroscepticism. In contrast to Taggart‟s 
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argument that party ideology does not predict levels of Euroscepticism, they 
suggest that cleavage theory best explains the range of likely responses of political 
parties to new issues emerging on their agenda. According to cleavage theory, 
divisions among political parties are reflections of existing divisions in the social 
structure and political ideology. From this perspective, political parties do not re-
constitute themselves with each electoral pressure but are already embedded 
within and constituted by their established political ideologies, which have 
developed historically. On the basis of this argument, the main hypothesis is that 
“these historically grounded ideologies constitute prisms through which political 
parties respond to the issue of European integration” (Marks et al., 2002). In their 
analysis, the strength of the explanatory power of cleavage theory is tested against 
three alternative explanations. The first of these is the argument that the positions 
taken by political parties on a new issue depend on the national context. From this 
perspective European integration is conceptualized as “the product of bargaining 
among governments representing the national interests of each member state”. 
Hence, a political party‟s position on European integration is determined by its 
national context, not by its ideology or electoral pressures. The second argument 
against cleavage theory studies party positions as a response to voting behavior, 
whereas the third alternative argument explains party positioning in relation to 
party competition. As Egea-de Haro (2003: 6) indicates: 
Mainstream parties attempt to protect the status quo by suppressing 
the salience of a new issue that cuts across existing dimensions of 
party competition, while small or excluded parties try to raise the 
salience of such issues and then reallocate the parties dimensions of 
competition. 
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The third explanation resonates with one of the core pillars of Paul Taggart‟s 
argument that a position of a political party within its national party system 
impacts upon its likelihood of adopting a Eurosceptical line. In contrast to the 
argument that party ideology is not a pre-determinant of party-based 
Euroscepticism (Taggart, 1998), cleavage theory posits that political party 
positions on European integration are bounded by historically developed political 
cleavages. In this sense, the issue of European integration is encapsulated and 
filtered by parties‟ preexisting political ideologies. However, the political 
cleavages argument is not without weaknesses either. Although the ideological 
position of a political party may be a valid point of departure for hypothesizing 
about the likelihood of a party‟s Eurosceptical stance, it is not a sufficient variable 
on its own in order to deduce its position on the European Union in general and 
European integration in particular. Taggart (1998) underlines the priority of 
national political structures and party systems in his cross-country comparative 
study of party Euroscepticism by arguing that Christian democratic, new politics, 
agrarian, new populist and neo-fascist parties adopt different positions towards the 
EU and European integration in different national settings.  
As an alternative line of inquiry, Simon Hix (2007) analyses party-based 
Euroscepticism from a rational choice institutionalist perspective, which 
conceptualizes Euroscepticism as „a set of preferences by citizens, parties and 
interest groups about institutional design in Europe‟ (Hix, 2007: 131).  Hix (2007) 
starts with a basic rational choice institutionalist argument: since institutions 
determine policy outcomes and actors‟ preferences derived from their 
expectations of the institutions‟ performance, then it follows that actors will 
support European integration for as long as their own policy preferences are well 
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served by it. The main logic behind this argument is the primacy assigned to 
institutions „on the basis of solving collective action problems serving a 
functionalist purpose of utility maximization‟ (Tsarouhas, 2006: 91). Actors 
formulate their institutional preferences according to the expected outcomes of 
their policy choices, which are informed by material calculations of utility. In 
addition to the instrumental function of institutions in determining actors‟ desired 
set of policy preferences, they also play a crucial role in shaping actors‟ behavior. 
To clarify the point further, Tsarouhas (2006: 91) outlines the character of rational 
choice perspective over the relationship between institutions and actors‟ behavior 
as follows: “Institutions play an important role to the extent that they allow for the 
conceptualization of a complex matrix consisting of sanctions, rewards and 
eventual outcomes around which behavior is centred”.        
Hix (2007) builds his rational choice institutionalist argument regarding party-
based Euroscepticism on the basis that institutions provide actors with a cognitive 
map by which they define their interests and form their policy preferences based 
on expected rewards and outcomes. Accordingly, if institutional policy outcomes 
correspond to the set of policy preferences and outcomes desired and expected by 
policy actors, then they are likely to be Euro-enthusiastic. On the other hand, if 
policy outcomes upset actors‟ domestic policy status quo they are likely to be 
Eurosceptic (Hix, 2007: 133). Hix‟s study makes a significant contribution by 
complementing the rational choice analysis of actors‟ preference formation with 
the political parties positioning along a center – periphery axis. The argument is 
formulated as follows: political parties that are located at the center of their 
national party systems tend to be Euro-enthusiastic, whereas party-based 
Euroscepticism remains a marginal phenomenon.  
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This rational choice institutionalist assumption regarding the connection between 
center / (periphery) and euroenthusiasm / (euroscepticism) is supported by the 
mass cues to elites argument, which suggests that “party leaders are better 
informed about the policy consequences of a particular action at the EU level” and 
hence “voters rely on „cues‟ from political parties regarding the impact of EU 
actions on their own preferences” (Hix, 2007: 136). On this basis, it is argued that 
“the parties of the extreme left and extreme right will be more Eurosceptic than 
mainstream parties” (Hix, 2007: 136). As long as the political parties located at 
the center of national party politics form a pro-EU coalition, those voters who 
support European integration tend to support mainstream policies and vice versa. 
Hence an opposition to the policies of the established parties implies an 
opposition to European integration, which manifests itself in the form of party-
based Euroscepticism. In this vein, Hix (2007) describes Euroscepticism not only 
as a peripheral issue but also as a political strategy which functions as anti-
centralization. This argument is similar to Taggart‟s (1998: 368) discussion of 
anti-EU politics of anti-establishment parties, which „promote themselves on the 
basis of distance from the parties of government.‟    
Secondly, it is argued that citizens who support governing parties are less likely to 
be Eurosceptic than the electorate of the parties of the extreme left and extreme 
right (Hix, 2007: 136). Political parties in government are viewed as central actors 
not only because they shape and control the policy agenda at the domestic level, 
but also because they set the long-term agenda in the European Council, pass 
legislation in the Council, and pick the Commissioners (Hix, 2007: 137). In this 
sense, governing political parties are considered to be more powerful in terms of 
directing the domestic policy agenda according to policy outcomes at the EU 
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level. Hence, in Hix‟s terms (2007: 137): “voters for governing parties, and 
interest groups who are close to parties in government, are less likely to be 
Eurosceptic than are voters for opposition parties and interest groups who are 
close to opposition parties”.  
A final important point to be made regarding Hix‟s rational institutionalist 
analysis concerns the correlation between domestic institutional designs and 
party-based Euroscepticism in order to offer an explanation for variations in 
Euroscepticism in different national settings. It is basically argued that political 
parties in majoritarian systems of government are more likely to be Eurosceptic 
than parties in consensus systems of government (Hix, 2007: 138).  
Hooghe (2007) underlines two major factors which generate political space for the 
articulation of anti-EU politics. The first factor entails the issues of strategy and 
ideology, which both enable and constraint political party behavior in the context 
of national electoral competition. Hence, within this framework the main line of 
inquiry is to understand to what extent political parties express Euroscepticism as 
a function of their strategic incentives, and to what extent anti-EU politics 
manifests itself as part of a political party‟s ideological commitments (Hooghe, 
2007: 6). The second factor concerns the linkage between public opinion and 
political parties. Cueing theory assumes that Euroscepticism is cued by political 
party elites and thereby posits that „external influences may be decisive in priming 
or framing attitudes towards a particular object‟ (Hooghe and Marks, 2007: 121). 
Hence the question of the extent to which political parties and voters cue each 
other presupposes a mutually constitutive relation between voters and parties in 
the formation of attitudes towards European integration.  
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In this sense, Hooghe (2007) makes a significant contribution to party-based 
Euroscepticism, regardless of its national context, by introducing two different 
lenses. First, one can approach party-based Euroscepticism from a rational choice 
perspective as a product of bottom-up process of preference formation. From this 
perspective, it is assumed that there is „at least a minority of voters with stable and 
transparent attitudes that affect their vote choice‟ (Hooghe, 2007: 6). The voters‟ 
preferences provide incentive structures, which determine the positioning of 
political parties toward a particular issue in the context of electoral competition. 
In that sense party-based Euroscepticism responds to and indeed originates from 
public Euroscepticism. This bottom-up approach to mass-elite linkages is based 
on a bottom-up „electoral connection‟- to quote Carrubba (2001) - which 
presupposes a “correspondence between masses and elites through a process of 
representation” (Steenbergen et al., 2007: 14).  
In contrast with this rational, bottom-up perspective of preference formation, a 
second argument emphasizes the decisive role of the structure of party 
competition in shaping party positioning. In this view, political parties do not 
mechanistically respond to public opinion; rather, they function as “organizations 
with historically rooted orientations that guide their response to new issues” 
(Hooghe, 2007: 6). According to this top-down perspective of preference 
formation, political party elites, not the masses, have coherent ideological maps 
which shape party positioning. This second perspective, which highlights the role 
of the ideological commitments of political parties, is similar to the cleavage 
theory hypothesis advocated by Marks et al. (2004: 585) as follows: “The 
response of a political party to an issue arising on the agenda is conditioned by the 
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bounded rationalities of party leaders and the reputational constraints imposed by 
prior policy decisions.”  
From this perspective, „the bounded rationalities‟ of political party elites shape the 
structure of party competition, which significantly constraint attitudes toward 
European integration and hence determine the political space for the expression of 
party-based Euroscepticism. In contrast to the bottom-up perspective of mass-elite 
linkages, this top-down perspective presupposes that the public adopts the 
position of political elites and „assures correspondence between masses and elites 
through a process of information and persuasion‟ (Steenbergen et al., 2007: 14). 
3.2 Impact of the European Issue on the National Politics of the CEECs: 
“Return to Europe” 
The end of the communist rule and the transition of CEECs to democracy were 
marked by the revolutions of 1989.  The disengagement of Central and Eastern 
European countries from communist rule brought an end to authoritarian patterns 
of politics. However, the successful democratization of former Soviet-ruled 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe was hindered by the persistence of post-
communist legacies in Eastern Europe. These were manifest in the form of social 
disintegration, atomization, psychological disorientation, economic crisis and a 
severe disruption caused by the transition from centrally-planned socialism to the 
market economy (Dellenbrant, 1993: 147).  
Correspondingly, the end of the communism in Central and Eastern Europe 
aroused great enthusiasm among West European states and it provided the EC 
with an opportunity to realize its pan-European objectives, which were defined in 
terms of overcoming the divisions of Europe (Schimmelfennig, 2001: 68). For the 
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Western European states, the transition of Central and Eastern European states‟ 
political and economic structures in accordance to the Western model served to 
strengthen the legitimacy of the EC model at both national and international 
levels. The official declarations made by the heads of state and government of the 
EC during the Strasbourg Summit of 1989 expressed the EC‟s willingness to 
contribute to the CEEC‟s transition to liberal democracy and market economy 
(quoted from Schimmelfennig, 2001: 67): 
The current changes and the prospects for development in Europe 
demonstrate the attraction which the political and economic model 
of Community Europe holds for many countries. The Community 
must live up to this expectation and these demands: its path lies not 
in withdrawal but in openness and cooperation, particularly with 
other European states. The objective remains that of overcoming 
the divisions of Europe 
 
Although the EC never explicitly mentioned the promise of full membership in its 
post- Cold War declarations, the 1990s were marked by a great enthusiasm for 
„Return to Europe‟, which was strongly used as a normative argument by the 
states of the Central and Eastern Europe. This generated „Euro-optimism‟, which 
coupled with the prospects of full membership, became a concrete reality with the 
opening of the accession negotiations for five CEE countries: Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia in March 1998 (Riishoj, 2004: 2). The 
normative implications of „Return to Europe‟ were fundamentally based on the 
idea of a shared identity between Eastern and Western Europe. However, for the 
CEE states, which had been living under communism for four decades, this notion 
of a shared European identity, required the adoption of EU norms and rules in 
addition to the transition process. The euro-optimism of the 1990s which 
generated a widespread „consensus without discussion‟ on the European issue 
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started to show signals of decline as EU membership became a realistic option 
and the costs of EU membership became more visible and tangible. Soren Riishoj 
(2004: 7) illustrates the point as follows: 
After the opening of negotiation about EU-membership, the 
populations and the political leaders also gained a more realistic 
picture of what the EU is really about. Thus coming closer to 
paradise many people changed their attitudes from being „euro-
naives‟ to becoming „euro-realists‟, maybe even euro-sceptics. 
 
In a similar vein, Henderson (2002) argues that as the normative rhetorical 
argument of „Return to Europe‟ was finalized with the prospect of membership, 
the so called „permissive consensus‟ or the „consensus without discussion‟ started 
to erode both at the mass and party elite levels. In her words (2002: 2): 
CEEC reactions to the EU membership, in both public and elite 
opinion, became more complex as general aspirations to Return to 
Europe were superseded by the more nuanced appreciations of the 
advantages and disadvantages of membership which accompanied 
the later stages of the negotiation process.  
 
Although Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002: 22) argue that the issue of European 
integration has very limited influence among voters in any country, Mudde argues 
that the question of EU accession „further increases the salience of the EU as a 
political issue in the party politics of Central and Eastern Europe‟ (Mudde, 2000: 
2).  
In a similar vein, Hooghe et al. (2002: 985) stress that „European politics is 
domestic politics by other means‟ in the context of CEE states. In this respect 
political parties play the most crucial role in instrumentalizing EU issues 
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according to their political agenda because the objective of membership becomes 
a central political issue especially in post-communist states.  
According to Mudde (2003) the issue of Europe becomes more salient in the CEE 
context. In his words (2003: 3): “the potential for political conflict over the EU is 
higher in the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe than in the old 
member states”. This argument is supported by three major reasons. First, elites 
and masses in the new member states have been less involved in the whole 
process of European integration. Second, the EU has been more politicized in the 
new member states, most notably through recent accession referendums in all 
eight countries, and finally a large section of the CEE population, including parts 
of the elites, have accepted EU accession mainly because it provided the best 
mechanism to be integrated into Europe and consolidate democratization 
processes at home. Finally, the EU forms a central topic of debate and political 
discourse among political parties in the candidate states, and the views of political 
actors, structured by different party systems, are relevant not only to the success 
of the enlargement project, but also to the future of the Union after their 
accession.  
On this basis, Mair‟s (2000) argument that Europe has a limited impact on 
national party systems and inter-party competition in member states of the 
European Union is not applicable to CEE. In the CEE context, the politicized 
issue of „Europe‟ and the question of European integration play a central role in 
structuring patterns of party competition and determining the positions of political 
parties on the question of EU membership and the future shape of the European 
project. Therefore, the study of how Europe plays a role in national political 
discourse, how political parties position 
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themselves regarding European integration, and how those positions affect party 
competition at the national level is of crucial importance.  
In order to understand these questions better, it is first necessary to plot the 
dimensions which structure parties‟ positions within their national party systems. 
This will then be followed by an analysis of whether parties‟ positions in their 
national systems determine their attitudes regarding the issue of Europe and 
European integration. However, it should be underlined that the primary focus is 
on the analysis of anti-EU politics, that is, the study of the mechanisms which lead 
to the formation of party level Eurosceptisim within the national party politics is 
the primary objective. The identification of these mechanisms will be followed by 
an attempt to understand the role played by party-based Euroscepticism within 
party competition and party politics.  
In order to achieve these objectives the chapter will offer a discussion of the major 
dimensions which are used to classify the political parties‟ positions in their party 
systems in the case of CEECs. This discussion will then be followed by a 
presentation of party-based Euroscepticism as an analytical concept.  
 
3.2.1 Euroscepticism and Party Attitudes toward European Integration in 
Central and Eastern Europe 
The literature on Western European political parties adopts two main dimensions 
in order to explain change and adaptation in political parties and map their 
political positions. These two dimensions are ideology and organization 
(Duverger, 1954). On the other hand, cleavage theory assumes that divisions 
among political parties are reflections of the existing divisions in the social 
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structure and political ideology. The main hypothesis is that „historically 
grounded ideologies constitute prisms through which political parties respond to 
the issue of European integration‟ (Marks et al., 2002: 585). However, neither of 
these approaches is likely to be applicable in the CEE context. The main reason is 
that political parties in CEE do not have stable constituencies divided on the basis 
of historically rooted social cleavages. Political parties in CEE do not act 
“according to bounded orientations that have historically provided a link between 
publics and elites” (Linden and Pohlman, 2003: 312).  The essential reason is 
obvious given the fact that these countries started their transition to multi-party 
only at the start of the 1990s.  
Mudde (2000: 3) argues that the urban-rural cleavage appears to be a more 
important factor than the left-right ideology spectrum in terms of determining 
positions of political parties. The center, both economically and culturally, 
appears to be more integrated with the Western states of Europe, while the 
periphery remains isolated and marginal both in terms of its contribution to the 
international economy and cultural integration with the Western parts of Europe. 
Hence on the basis of this argument, the conclusion is drawn that in CEE, parties 
which represent the urban center are more likely to express support for European 
integration, while parties that represent the electorate at the rural periphery are 
more likely to be in the Euro-realist or Euro-sceptic camp. The main contribution 
of this argument is that “the question of EU accession adds an additional 
dimension in the patterns of party competition by transforming the prevailing 
urban-rural divide into an anti-EU center-periphery cleavage” (Mudde, 2000: 2). 
Alternatively, Marks et al. (2006: 157) argue that there are two major dimensions 
which structure party competition that can be adopted both in the Western and 
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Eastern contexts. The first one is the economic right-left dimension, and the 
second is the „non-economic, cultural, new politics‟ dimension. The economic 
dimension is concerned with the redistribution of wealth and the regulation of the 
economy by the government. The left pole prioritizes economic equality, whereas 
the right prioritizes individual economic freedom. Including Marks et al. (2006), 
many scholars agree on the fact that the left-right spectrum in terms of economy 
rather than political ideology serves as a main dimension of party competition in 
Central and Eastern Europe too (Evans & Whitefield, 1993; Kitschelt et al., 1999).  
On the other hand, the second dimension, which has started to have a significant 
impact on the structuring of party competition in Western Europe since the 1970s, 
is the new politics dimension. This cultural, new politics dimension addresses 
several non-economic issues which belong to a broader range of spectrum than 
those of the economic left-right dimension. The new politics dimension is strongly 
determined by the national context. In some countries it may represent 
environmental protection and sustainable growth, while in others it may address 
traditional values and represent the religious vs. secular divide. Alternatively, it 
may prioritize the defense of the national community.  
On the basis of this variation, Marks et al (2006: 167) classify the new politics 
into two poles, which are identified as: green/alternative/libertarian (Gal), and 
traditionalism/authority/nationalism (Tan). Political actors position themselves in 
relation to these dimensions regarding the issue of European integration.  
According to their findings, Euroscepticism in CEE is prevalent among the radical 
left and radical Tan parties. They strongly support the argument that the positions 
of parties on European integration determine the main axis of party competition in 
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CEE.  They assert that Right-Gal parties support European integration, while Left-
Tan parties express Euroscepticism. Their conclusion is verified in light of 
empirical findings. Szczerbiak (2001) demonstrates that in Poland opponents of 
European integration vote for the Peasants Self Defence Party or the League of 
Polish Families, a Catholic and a nationalist political party respectively. Marks et 
al. (2006) advocate that the issue of European integration structures the axis of 
party competition on the basis of Left-Gal/ Right-Tan axis in Western Europe, 
whereas in Central and Eastern Europe it is the Left-Tan/ Right-Gal axis which 
determines how parties position themselves on the issue of European integration.  
This identification offers a better understanding of how economic policy 
preferences of the political elites and masses overlap with cultural differences. In 
Szczerbiak and Taggart‟s (2002:17) understanding this analytical differentiation 
does not exist. On the contrary they point out to the fact that “parties taking 
Eurosceptical positions in Central and Eastern European candidate states are 
predominantly on the right of the ideological spectrum.”    
3.2.2 Conceptualization of Party-Based Euroscepticism in the Context of 
Central and Eastern European Countries 
The study of party-level Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe is less 
common compared with the study of Euroscepticism in Western Europe. Taggart 
and Szczerbiak (2001) advance a conceptual definition of Euroscepticism. 
Although they adopt Taggart‟s earlier understanding of the term defined as “the 
idea of contingent or  qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and 
unqualified opposition to the process of European integration” (Taggart, 1998: 
366), they introduce a differentiation between “Hard” and “Soft” Euroscepticism 
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in the context of the national party politics and party systems of CEECs. Their 
definition of Hard Euroscepticism is as follows (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2002: 7): 
Hard Euroscepticism is where there is a principled opposition to the 
EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties 
who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, 
or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed 
to the whole project of European integration as it is currently 
conceived.  
 
There are two basic implications of this definition. The first one is that a political 
party expresses hard Euroscepticism if it is a single-issue anti-EU Party, which 
mobilizes its electorate base on the basis of a principled rejection of European 
integration. The second implication is that a political party can be classified as 
hard Eurosceptic if it fundamentally questions the terms of its country‟s 
membership and comprehensively opposes the European integration project on 
the basis of its ideological position. Accordingly, hard Euroscepticism is defined 
as an „outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic 
integration and opposition to their country joining or remaining members of the 
EU‟ (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001: 10).  
On the other hand, Soft Euroscepticism is defined as follows (Szczerbiak and 
Taggart, 2002: 7): 
Where there is not a principled objection to European integration or 
EU membership but concerns on or a number of policy areas lead 
to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there 
is a sense that national interest is currently at odds with the EU‟s 
trajectory.  
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Hence soft Euroscepticism is conceptualized as a „contingent opposition‟, which  
implies that an alteration either to a particular policy area or a shift in the national 
interest can lead to a support or even an encouragement of the project of European 
integration in its current form. On the basis of this, Soft Euroscepticism is further 
sub-divided into „policy‟ and „national interest‟ Euroscepticism which function as 
the main indicators of a Soft Eurosceptic position of a political party (Taggart and 
Szczerbiak, 2001: 10).  
It is argued that policy Euroscepticism exists to the extent that a political party 
expresses opposition either to measures designed to deepen European political and 
economic cooperation or an existing particular policy often framed within the 
debate over the policy competencies of the EU vs. national government. On the 
other hand, national interest Euroscepticism entails the defense of the national 
interest against EU competencies. This form of soft Euroscepticism does not 
necessarily have to reject the project of European integration in principle. On the 
contrary, it may be supportive of further deepening under the rubric of a national-
interest Eurosceptic rhetoric designed for boosting political support at the 
domestic level. To put it more clearly, soft Euroscepticism exists to the extent that 
“a political party uses the rhetoric of contestation over the European issue as part 
of its political repertoire” (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002: 7).  
Although the theoretical framework by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002) has been 
extensively used by scholars when analyzing Euroscepticism, it generated a 
variety of definitional controversies and has become a subject of critique. Richard 
Katz (2008: 155) addresses the possibility of alternative conceptualizations of 
Euroscepticism by referring to definitional problems with the use of 
Euroscepticism within the academic discourse.  
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Firstly, although Euroscepticism is operationalized in terms of opposition to the 
European project whether in contingent – soft- or principled- hard- forms, it needs 
to cover „those who merely want to make haste more slowly or who express 
uncertainty about the wisdom of some or all of the proposed “advances”‟, on the 
grounds that „scepticism‟ linguistically denotes doubts or reservations instead of 
an outright opposition. Secondly, although Katz (2008: 155) agrees that Hard 
Euroscepticism denotes wholesale opposition to the process of European 
integration, he addresses what it is that soft eurosceptics oppose.  
Thus, Katz (2008) identifies several objects of Euroscepticism, which include the 
development of any form of supranational European institutions that would 
impinge on national sovereignty; the widening of the EU, which implies the 
expansion of the Union to include more members; the deepening of the EU, which 
would increase competencies of the Union; specific institutional arrangements, 
which would shift the balance of power between the Union and member states in 
favor of the former; and specific EU policies such as the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU).  
Katz (2008: 156) argues that pro-EU coalitions frame any opposition to one of the 
objects of Euroscepticism in terms of Hard Euroscepticism as a strategy to 
marginalize soft Eurosceptics from the established pro-EU consensus and 
discourse within the national politics. Given the fact that soft Euroscepticism can 
express opposition to different objects of skepticism simultaneously, it becomes 
harder to avoid the association of soft Euroscepticism with its hard form. In a 
similar vein, Henderson (2002: 7) points to the lack of precision within the 
definition of Soft Eurocepticism as follows: 
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Unfortunately, „soft‟ Euroscepticism becomes a rather broad catch-
all category, embracing both mainstream parties, which have been 
largely successful in pursuing their states‟ ambitions to join the EU, 
such as Orbán‟s Fidesz in Hungary or Klaus‟s Civic Democratic 
Party (ODS) in the Czech Republic, as well as more extremist 
parties such as the Czech Republicans, the Greater Romania Party 
and the Slovak National Party.  
 
Henderson (2002) rightly points to the lack of explanation concerning party 
position and the form of Euroscepticism within the framework offered by Taggart 
and Szczerbiak (2001). Although it is argued that “soft Euroscepticism seems to 
be expressed by some mainstream parties” (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001: 22), 
they assume that mainstream parties do not express Euroscepticism. Even if it is 
accepted that soft Euroscepticism can be manifest both in mainstream and 
marginal parties, the proposition that “hard Eurosceptic parties are peripheral to 
their party systems” (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001: 23) becomes questionable as 
mainstream political parties can adopt a hard eurosceptic discourse or may shift 
towards a „softer‟ eurosceptic position as a strategy for party competition. In this 
way, soft euroscepticism becomes a political and discursive device for 
mainstream parties in their party systems.  
Kopecky and Mudde (2002) make a significant contribution to the literature by 
offering a constructive critique of the Taggart and Szczerbiak framework, 
introducing a two-dimensional typology to the analysis of party-based 
Euroscepticism. While Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002) view party-based 
Euroscepticism as a consequence of party strategy for electoral competition, 
Kopecky and Mudde (2002) assert the centrality of ideology, rather than strategy, 
as the main explaining factor. Instead of conceptualizing the ideology-strategy 
debate as two separate poles, Kopecky and Mudde (2002) argue that in the context 
of Central and Eastern Europe, ideological orientation to the issue of European 
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integration “is not wholly unassociated with party competition” (Kopecky and 
Mudde cited in Gaisbauer, 2007: 59).        
Kopecky and Mudde (2002: 300) conceptualize Euroscepticism by differentiating 
between diffuse and specific support for European integration, which generates 
four different sub- categories: europhiles, europhobes, EU-optimists and EU-
pessimists. Before proceeding, a description of the two dimensions is important. 
The first dimension expresses „support for the ideas of the European integration, 
while the second refers to a „support for the European Union‟. The first 
dimension, that is diffuse support, involves a distinction between two sub-
categories: the europhiles and europhobes. The europhiles substantially support 
the principles of European integration which can be described as „institutionalized 
cooperation on the basis of pooled sovereignty‟. On the contrary, europhobes 
reject the underlying principles of European integration due to their ideological 
positioning. The second dimension, specific EU support, generates the sub-
categories: “EU-optimists” and “EU-pessimists”.  
The first reflects its position in terms of supporting the EU as a holistic project 
and holding an optimistic belief towards the direction of its development. EU-
pessimists hold the opposite view, which entails pessimism towards the direction 
of the development of the Union and its current state of evolution. Having 
clarified the typology of party positions which is developed and utilized by 
Kopecky and Mudde (2002: 302) in the study of the relationship between 
Europeanization and Euroscepticism, an explanatory synthesis is warranted in 
order to explore the roots of Eurosceptical positioning among parties.  
Euroscepticism originates from the intersection of a Europhile and EU-pessimist 
attitude towards European integration in particular and the EU in general. 
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Following this logic, the Eurosceptical position involves a support for the 
underlying principles of European integration notwithstanding pessimism towards 
the “current state and future reflections of these ideas.”   
On the other hand, Euro-enthusiasts can be described as “parties that support the 
general ideas of European integration (Europhile) and believe that the EU is the 
institutionalization of these ideas” (Gaisbauer, 2007: 60). Euro-pragmatists 
combine the Europhobe and EU-optimist positions. They do not support the 
general ideas of European integration, yet they believe the EU is the best form of 
integration. In Kopecky and Mudde‟s (2002: 303) terms Europhobes “do not 
support the general ideas of European integration underlying the EU, nor do they 
necessarily oppose them, yet they do support the EU. In general this group will 
contain parties that do not hold a firm ideological opinion on European 
integration, and on the basis of pragmatic (often utilitarian) considerations decide 
to assess the EU positively because they deem it profitable for their own country 
of constituency.” Finally Euro-rejects combine Europhobe and EU-pessimist 
attitudes; they „neither subscribe to the ideas underlying the European integration, 
nor to the EU‟ (Gaisbauer, 2007: 60). On this basis, Gaisbauer (2007: 60) 
advocates the hypothesis that change of party positions in European orientation is 
mainly to be expected on the support for EU axis and to a significantly less extent 
on the „support for European integration axis.‟  
This argument has two main implications. Firstly, political parties‟ support for the 
general ideas underlying European integration is a consequence of the dynamics 
of national party competition and hence it functions as a political strategy. Their 
support for, or opposition to, the EU on the other hand stems from their ideology. 
Secondly, changes in the levels of political parties‟ support for the EU determine 
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whether they will be Euroenthusiasts or Eurosceptics, while they will retain their 
position towards support for the ideas underlying European integration. It is 
argued that specific support, that is “support for the general practice of European 
integration and the EU as it is developing” (Kopecky, 2004: 231), is bounded by 
party ideology; whereas, diffuse support, that is support for the general ideas of 
European integration, is bounded by political strategy (Kopecky and Mudde, 
2002: 230). Therefore Euroscepticism does not have different variants with 
different qualities as in Szczerbiak and Taggart‟s understanding. Moreover, 
Kopecky concurs with the fact that “all Eurosceptics are essentially in favor of 
European integration” (Kopecky, 2004: 232). This claim is justified within a 
framework as political parties that do not express neither diffuse nor specific 
support, are classified as “Eurorejects”, which corresponds to Szczerbiak and 
Taggart‟s conceptualization of hard Euroscepticism.  
This study attempts to utilize both Kopecky and Mudde‟s two-fold typology on 
the one hand; Taggart and Szczerbiak‟s differentiation of hard and soft 
Euroscepticism on the other. Kopecky and Mudde‟s framework contributes to our 
understanding of soft and hard versions of Euroscepticism on the basis of a 
differentiation between strategy and ideology. In this manner, it becomes possible 
to explain changes in the levels of political parties‟ support of Europe and 
European integration. However, it is not the aim of this study to relate the varying 
degrees of support and opposition to the EU and European integration to political 
parties‟ ideology and strategy for electoral competition.  
The main objective of this study is to understand how Europe plays a role in 
shaping national party politics and political discourse, and how domestic political 
actors construct collective understandings of the EU and European integration 
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either in pro- or anti-EU forms. In order to examine this process, this study 
investigates how political actors problematise the issue of Europe and European 
integration and why. Hence, in terms of research focus it asks how anti-EU 
politics shapes national party politics. To understand that, pro-EU positions are 
also taken into account. In this sense, Kopecky and Mudde (2002) provide us with 
a conceptual framework through which pro- and anti-EU positions can be 
examined on a continuum. However, their uniform understanding of 
Euroscepticism, which does not entail a differentiation between its hard and soft 
versions, limits our understanding of Euroscepticism as a multi-faceted 
phenomenon. Furthermore, Kopecky and Mudde‟s two-fold typology frames the 
positions of political parties and any changes to them within a strategy-ideology 
debate, which is not the aim of this study. As mentioned earlier, our central 
research focus is not to examine the whole range of political party positions on the 
issue of Europe and European integration, but mainly anti-EU positions in the 
form of hard and soft Euroscepticism. The latter‟s impact on national party 
politics cannot be understood in isolation from Europhile positions of political 
parties in the countries‟ respective party systems.  
On this basis, Kopecky and Mudde‟s two-fold typology will be employed to the 
extent that the examination of pro-EU positions of mainstream political parties 
becomes a necessary component in our understanding of the role of party-based 
Euroscepticism in national party systems and politics. On the other hand, to 
understand the differing levels and manifestation of party-based Euroscepticism, 
Szczerbiak and Taggart‟s conceptualization will be employed. It is preferred over 
Kopecky and Mudde‟s definition of Euroscepticism on the grounds that it 
provides us with a framework which recognizes the differing levels and types of 
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party-based Euroscepticism in soft and hard forms. In this manner, it becomes 
possible to reveal the multi-faceted nature of party-based Euroscepticism. 
Moreover, this framework helps us uncover the role of agency by showing how 
different political actors (parties) problematise the issue of Europe and European 
integration differently through different levels and manifestations of party-based 
Euroscepticism. On these grounds, this study adopts a combined approach to the 
study of party-based Euroscepticism in order to have an enriched understanding of 
the role anti-EU politics plays in national party politics, as well as the significance 
of understanding political parties as political agents with the ability to construct 
the issue of Europe and European integration in different ways by endorsing 
different positions and attitudes. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
EUROSCEPTICISM AS A REALIGNING ISSUE IN POLISH PARTY 
POLITICS 
 
 
 
By the late 1990s, the CEECs began to distance themselves from the euro-
idealism of the early post-communist years, when accession to the European 
Union was framed within the „Return to Europe‟ argument. Realistic evaluations 
of the advantages and disadvantages of membership became a major theme of 
political debate at the mass public opinion and party elite levels. The Central and 
Eastern European countries‟ decade of experience with the trials of transition to 
liberal political and economic structures resulted into a gradual decline of the 
idealism of the early post communist years (Hughes et al, 2008: 181). Prior to the 
second half of the 1990s, the debate on the EU‟s Eastern Enlargement was 
concerned with the adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria, which were formulated 
at the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993, and the implementation of the 
pre-accession strategy, which was introduced by the Essen European Council in 
December 1994 (Henderson, 2002: 2). However, in the aftermath of the opening 
of accession negotiations in March 1998, the CEECs went through a process of 
transition from being merely passive objects, who uncritically endorsed the 
prospect of EU membership, to active subjects of European integration, who 
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critically engaged with the issue of EU membership by evaluating the potential 
costs and benefits of accession (Henderson, 2002: 3; Szczerbiak, 2005: 5).   
In order to evaluate the impact of European integration in particular, and the 
salience of the European issue in general, this chapter analyzes the results of the 
1997, 2001 and 2005 Polish Parliamentary elections in light of the impact of the 
EU on inter-party competition by examining the extent to which Polish political 
parties refer to the European integration and the EU in their elections programs 
and campaigns. In addition, the October 2000 Presidential election will be 
analyzed due to the fact that this was the first major election to be held in Poland 
after the start of accession negotiations, and the candidates‟ campaigns paid high 
attention to the EU and European integration (Szczerbiak, 2001: 8). Before the 
presidential election of October 2000, the question of EU membership, alongside 
NATO membership generated an overwhelming consensus both among the public 
and the established political parties, which was due to two major reasons. First, 
until the start of accession negotiations neither parties nor party elites engaged in 
an active discussion over the potential costs and benefits of accession. Secondly, 
the 2000 October elections reflected the insights of the newly emerging political 
debate concerning EU membership and its potential costs, which shifted the axis 
of political competition from traditional party cleavages to attitudes towards 
European integration.  
In addition to the analysis of primary order elections, the 2003 Polish Accession 
Referendum and the 2004 EP election, as a case of a second-order election, will 
be examined. The analysis of a second-order election is warranted to show how 
the issue of Europe and European integration forms a bridge between national and 
supranational elections in accordance with Reif and Schmitt‟s perspective of the 
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second-order election model. According to Reif and Schmitt, “the national arena 
is the most important one in European nation states, and elections for national 
public office are the most salient both for the public and political parties” (cited in 
Marsh, 1998: 591). Hence, they are called first-order elections. On the other hand, 
“elections other than general elections to the Parliament, such as elections for 
local government bodies are second order elections, in which EP elections are also 
included” (cited in Marsh, 1998: 592). Reif and Schmitt argue that second order 
elections cannot be separated from first order elections as “concerns which are 
appropriate to the first order arena will affect behavior in second order elections” 
(cited in Marsh, 1998: 592). 
In this sense, a combined analysis of national and EP elections will contribute to 
our understanding of the relation between political and electoral dynamics of 
primary and second order elections. Secondly, it will be possible to explore how 
the issue of Europe and European integration becomes a new yet important 
dimension of inter-party competition in supranational as well as national 
elections. 
Moreover, the analysis of the 2003 Accession Referendum enables to observe the 
extent to which support for the issue of Polish EU membership is consolidated 
and de-coupled from the national political discussions concerning the issue of 
Europe and European Integration in the eyes of the mass public. A combined 
analysis of elections and referendums will demonstrate how domestic political 
campaigns shape and influence voters‟ preferences and positions regarding the 
question of Polish accession in particular and European integration in general. 
Moreover, the analysis of the 2004 European Parliament election results will 
demonstrate how strong Eurosceptic tendencies in the 2001 Polish parliament 
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were not silenced and influenced electoral dynamics in the run up to the 2004 EP 
election.  
In light of Ladrech‟s (2008) framework for political party Europeanization, this 
chapter will analyze the impact of Europe and European integration on Polish 
party politics by focusing on the role of the politics of Euroscepticism in shaping 
patterns of party competition and party politics. Ladrech‟s (2008) framework, in 
which five interrelated areas manifest evidence of political party Europeanization, 
is used. Recalling our discussion of five areas: (1) programmatic change, (2) 
organizational change, (3) patterns of party competition, (4) party-government 
relations, (5) transnational party cooperation, the focus is here on the analysis of 
the first and third dimensions. The analysis of the politics of Euroscepticism and 
Europeanization of political parties examines the extent to which mainstream 
political parties change their party programme and whether the issue of Europe 
becomes an issue of domestic political constellation. This chapter will study the 
Europeanization of Polish political parties by concentrating on whether the issue 
of Europe and European integration becomes a major theme in national inter-party 
competition. To do so, thechapter will make use of the mainstream parties‟ 
election programs to observe how mainstream political parties integrate the issue 
of Europe and European integration into their political discourse.     
 
4.1 The Main Features of the Polish Party System  
The objective of accession to the European Union and NATO formed the core 
pillars of Polish foreign policy since 1989, gaining the support of the majority of 
political parties, although they differed in terms of their enthusiasm and 
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approaches as to how to attain those objectives (Szczerbiak, 2001: 5).  On the 
mass public opinion level, Polish support for EU membership was very high; 72% 
in March, April and June 1997. It declined to 66 % in May 1998, two months after 
the start of accession negotiations, and support for EU membership suffered a 
steady decline reaching a low of 55% in September 2000 (Szczerbiak, 2001: 7).   
Nevertheless, before interpreting the impact of the issue of Europe and European 
integration in Polish party politics in light of our electoral results, it is necessary 
to briefly mention the nature of the Polish party system in the aftermath of 1989. 
The Polish party system is characterized by an extraordinary fluidity since its 
democratic rebirth in 1989 (Markowski and Tucker, 2008: 5). Although Poland is 
described as “one of the few unquestionable success stories among the post-
communist countries” due to its political, economic and social transformation 
(Smolar, 1998: 122), the Polish political party system has remained largely 
unconsolidated in comparison to the Czech Republic and Hungary (Markowski 
and Tucker, 2008: 5; Smolar, 1998: 122). In the aftermath of the collapse of 
communism, Poland was “ run by the various parties and groupings that emerged 
from the Solidarity opposition movement, which had precipitated the demise of 
the communist system following its overwhelming victory in the elections of 
1989” (Szczerbiak, 2002: 2).  However, during the 1989-1993 period Solidarity, 
which was always an ideologically heterogeneous political construct, faced the 
serious challenge of rapid fragmentation and was eventually disintegrated. The 
political vacuum in the Polish party system left by the disintegration of Solidarity 
resulted in the electoral victory of the ex-communist political forces in the 1993 
Parliamentary elections, which brought the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and 
the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) in power.   
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The SLD, which was formed in the early 1990s, comprised a variety of political 
parties and factions „clustered around Social Democracy of the Polish Republic 
(SdRP), the direct organizational successor to the Polish communist party‟ 
(Szczerbiak and Bil, 2008: 6). On the other hand, the PSL was formed in 1990, as 
a successor to the former communist satellite United Peasant Party (ZSL). As a 
result, the 1993-1997 SLD-PSL government represented “the former communists‟ 
comeback” to the Polish political scene, which was consolidated by the electoral 
victory of the SLD-backed Aleksander Kwasniewski over the “legendary 
Solidarity leader” Lech Walesa in the 1995 Presidential election (Szczerbiak, 
2002: 2). The electoral success of the SLD in the 1993 Parliamentary elections 
had two major implications for Polish party politics. First, in addition to the 
hegemonic impact of Solidarity on its successor, fragmented groupings, the 
formation of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), impeded the rise of modern, 
autonomous political parties in Poland (Szczerbiak, 2002: 2; Smolar, 1998: 124). 
Secondly, these two strong political forces led to the emergence of a bipolar 
structure of party competition mainly on the basis of differences in 
attitudes toward the communist past. In this way, the main axis of political 
competition and hence the major cleavage dividing political parties in Polish party 
politics emerges on the basis of attitudes toward Poland‟s communist past. In this 
sense, the cleavage between the winners and losers of transition becomes the 
main political cleavage and Polish political parties are established and develop 
their ideologies on this basis. This is very significant for the analysis of party-
based Euroscepticism in Polish party politics. Party-based Euroscepticism in 
Poland emerges hand in hand with the process of Europeanization. As the analysis 
will show, the Europeanization of Polish political parties does not create an 
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autonomous „European‟ cleavage, but rather political parties filter the issue of 
Europe and European integration with respect to the prevailing dimension of 
political competition. What changes as a result of the Europeanization of Polish 
party politics is the fact that political parties frame the prevailing cleavage on the 
basis of their differences in attitudes toward the issue of Europe and European 
integration. In this way, the politics of Euroscepticism becomes a powerful 
political and to some extent an ideological mechanism through which Polish 
political parties position themselves in the party system and re-frame the existing 
political cleavage by adding a European dimension. 
 
4.2 The Analysis of Polish Parliamentary Elections and Presidential Elections 
The September 1997 Parliamentary Election 
The 1997 parliamentary election, Poland‟s third parliamentary election since the 
fall of communism, resulted into a major defeat for the previous coalition 
government, led by the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and its coalition partner, 
the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) (Szczerbiak, 1998: 58). The 1997 parliamentary 
election is considered to be of significant importance due to the fact that it was the 
first election in post-communist Poland to be held after a parliament had run its 
full four-year term (Szczerbiak, 1998: 59). However, in terms of voter turnout, 
only 42.92 % of eligible voters went to the polls, less than half of the electorate. 
In comparison to the previous 1993 parliamentary election turnout, a significant 
decline was registered: from 52.06 % to 42.92 % (Szczerbiak, 2001: 5; 
Szczerbiak, 1998: 59). 
 70 
 
While the Polish right was virtually excluded from the 1993- 1997 Polish 
Parliament, it won the 1997 election. In total ten political parties competed in 
those elections, and five of them managed to pass the 5% threshold to enter 
Parliament. These were the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS), the Democratic 
Left Alliance (SLD), the Freedom Union (UW), the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), 
and the Movement for Poland‟s Reconstruction (ROP).  
The AWS was formed by post-Solidarity center-right parties and groupings in 
June 1996, comprising „22 parties and other groupings spearheaded by the 
Solidarity Union‟ (Szczerbiak, 1998: 64). Similar to its predecessor, the AWS is 
internally characterized as a heterogeneous grouping, which “encompasses 
liberals, Christian Democrats, conservatives of varying stripes including even 
radical nationalists and Catholic integralists” (Smolar, 1998: 126).     
Table 1: Political Parties in the 1997 Polish Parliament  
 Votes % Seats 
Solidarity Electoral Action 
(AWS) 
4,427,373 33.83 201 
Democratic Left Alliance 
(SLD) 
3,551,224 27.13 164 
Freedom Union (UW) 1,749,518 13.37 60 
Polish Peasant Party (PSL) 956,184 7.31 27 
Movement for Poland‟s 727,072 5.56 6 
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Reconstruction (ROP) 
 Source: Parliamentary Election Results for Poland: Elections Held in 1997, 
Inter-parliamentary Union, www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2256_arc.htm. 
 
The AWS finished the 1997 election first and formed a government with the 
Freedom Union as its minor coalition partner. The AWS victory represented the 
return of the Polish right in the form of a united bloc. The Polish right, which lost 
the 1993 elections because of its disunity and extensive fragmentation, made a 
crucial impact on the Polish political landscape through the electoral victory of the 
AWS, which proved to be the only successful right-wing unity initiative in terms 
of building a coherent electoral right-wing bloc with the capacity to effectively 
challenge the SLD.  
The key dimension of political party competition in the 1997 elections was framed 
in terms of a battle between the post-Solidarity and post-Communist groupings, 
which had previously emerged with the presidential elections of 1995. The two 
major competing candidates were Lech Walesa, who represented the post-
Solidarity group, and Aleksander Kwasniewski, who was the leader of the SLD. 
The 1995 presidential elections resulted into a victory for Kwasniewski, and “the 
battle between Walesa and Kwasniewski developed into a contest between the 
representatives of the two historic formations: post-Solidarity and post-
Communists” (Szczerbiak, 1998: 62).  
The AWS can be described as a liberal-conservative right party, advocating the 
kind of free-market reforms, introduced under the rubric of the 1990 Balcerowicz 
Plan by the Solidarity governments of 1989-1993. On the other hand, the 
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ideological profile of the post-communist right can be described as traditionalist-
conservative, which associates itself more with traditional values and puts heavy 
emphasis on traditional notions of family, religion and nation. Within this context, 
Szczerbiak (1998) argues that the line of demarcation between the post-Solidarity 
and post-communist right-wing political elites is fundamentally based on attitudes 
towards the communist past, which has become the key dimension that determines 
patterns of party competition in the Polish party system. The AWS owes its 1997 
victory mostly to its successful  “attempt to draw an analogy between the new-
spirit right-wing “political unity” represented by the formation of AWS and the 
“societal unity” which had characterized Solidarity‟s previous anti-communist 
struggles in 1980-81 and 1989” (Szczerbiak, 1998: 65). Therefore, the 
overarching theme in the AWS‟ election campaign was defined in terms of anti-
communism, and opposition to post-communist representatives headed by the 
SLD. In the context of the 1997 elections, the key dimension of political party 
competition was the attitudes towards the past, rather than any discussion of 
Polish accession to the EU in particular, and the issue of Europe in general. 
Although the end of the 1990s marks the beginning of the decline of Euro-
enthusiasm, there is still a lack of political discussion concerning the costs and 
benefits of Polish EU entry and the issue of Europe within the ideological and 
policy profiles of Polish political parties, all of which viewed the issue of Polish 
membership as a foreign policy objective. 
The October 2000 Presidential Election 
Until the October 2000 Presidential elections, attitudes towards the past and 
moral-cultural issues formed the structure of party competition. However, the 
examination of the presidential campaigns of the four main candidates, all of 
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whom had pro-EU profiles, reveals that Polish party competition is re-structured 
on the basis of socio-economic divisions between the winners and losers of the 
transition (Szczerbiak, 2001: 8). In this respect, the salience of the socio-economic 
differences between the winners and losers increases and the issues of Europe and 
European integration are assimilated into the transition arguments.  
The four main candidates are Aleksander Kwasniewski; Andrzej Olechowski,an 
independent liberal-conservative; Marian Krzaklewski, the leader of the AWS and 
the Solidarity Trade Union; and finally Jaroslaw Kalinowski, the leader of the 
Polish Peasant Party (PSL). Among the four candidates, Kwasniewski and 
Olechowski were the most supportive of Polish membership to the EU and they 
gained the highest share of votes as can be seen in Table 2 below. 
Although the issue of Polish EU membership was not the major theme of the 
candidates‟ presidential election campaigns, Kwasniewski and Olechowski 
expressed strong support for Polish membership without touching upon the social 
and economic costs of accession. The other two candidates, on the other hand, 
paid attention to the potential costs of Polish membership, while retaining their 
pro-EU stance.  
Table 2: Four Main Candidate in October 2000 Polish Presidential Elections 
Candidate Votes Percentage (%) 
Aleksander 
Kwasniewski 
(SLD) 
9,485,224 53,90 
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Source: Polish State Electoral Commission, http://www.pkw.gov.pl/ 
President Kwasniewski framed the question of EU membership as an opportunity 
for Poland on pragmatic reasons in the form of security and economic gains. 
Kwasniewski‟s pragmatic approach to the EU neglected any concerns over the 
potential costs of accession. With regards to the possible benefits that Poland 
could gain, he stated that EU membership “is an opportunity for Poland. Both for 
our security and sovereignty” (Szczerbiak, 2001: 9). His pragmatism based on 
economic gains can be best illustrated by the following statement: “the EU is a 
way of modernizing our economy. It gives us the chance of broader participation 
in European markets. Our economy will also gain from overseas investment. We 
won‟t be the pariahs of Europe” (Szczerbiak, 2001: 9).  
Kwasniewski‟s approach to Polish membership is based on the conviction that the 
integration of the Polish market to European markets through its integration in a 
free-market, liberal economy would be best achieved and consolidated through 
EU membership, preventing Poland from remaining on the fringes of the 
Andrzej 
Olechowski 
(Independent)  
3,044,141 17,30 
Marian 
Krzaklewski 
(AWS) 
2,739,621 15,57 
Jaroslaw 
Kalinowski (PSL) 
1,047,949 5,95 
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European economy. Hence, the issue of Polish membership to the Union is not 
discussed within the frame of the overall evaluation of the workings of the Union 
or the cost associated with membership, but is framed within an instrumental 
logic, which perceives EU membership as a means to achieve a broader end, 
which is the enhancement of the Polish national interest. Based on Kopecky and 
Mudde‟s definitions, Kwasniewski adopts an EU-optimist and Europhile position, 
which makes him a Euroenthusiast. In line with Kopecky and Mudde‟s definition 
of Euroenthusiast, Kwasniewski does not express any concerns regarding the 
general ideas of European integration and believes that the EU is the best way to 
further national interest. 
Olechowski shared Kwasniewski‟s arguments concerning EU membership as an 
opportunity for Poland to consolidate and further its security and economic gains. 
However, Olechowski paid more attention to the normative value of EU 
membership. As opposed to the pragmatic approach of Kwasniewski, Olechowski 
adopted a normative stance towards the issue of membership, framed in terms of a 
“civilisational necessity”, rather than as a means to modernize the Polish economy 
and further its national security.    
Krzaklewski, the AWS leader, failed to receive the highest share of votes in the 
presidential election, despite the fact that the party had defeated the SLD in the 
1997 parliamentary election. Krzaklewski‟s stance on Polish EU membership is 
significant as he developed his position on the basis of the prevailing battle 
between the post- Solidarity and post-communist camps. This indicates how the 
issue of Europe is filtered and incorporated into the prevailing dimension of 
political competition, based on the differences in attitudes towards Poland‟s 
communist past. 
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Krzaklewski advocated the argument that Poland needed to be on equal grounds 
with other member states in the Union, composed of „free states‟, who retained 
their national identity and sovereignty. In this sense, Krzaklewski described the 
clash between the AWS stance on Polish membership and Kwasniewski‟ 
approach as a “civilisational battle”, which will determine in what way Poland 
„will unite in the uniting of Europe‟. In this sense, post-Solidarity elites adopted 
an intergovernmentalist approach, which expressed support for the EU as a union 
of free states with each retaining its national identity and sovereignty. On the 
other hand, the post-communists adopted a supranational approach, which framed 
Polish membership as a necessity to become part of a broader European nation. 
Rather than adopting a normative approach to the issue of EU membership, 
Krzaklewski viewed Polish EU membership as “a condition of the better solution 
of the economic and social problems faced by Poland and as the road to a fuller 
realization of the national interest and to the strengthening of Polish identity” 
(Szczerbiak, 2001: 10). Although Krzaklewski sounds similar to Kwasniewski by 
framing the benefits of EU membership as the best means to solve Poland‟s 
economic and social problems, his emphasis on the potential costs to Polish 
sovereignty and national interest positions him close to a soft Eurosceptic attitude. 
Consequently, the 2000 Presidential election is significantly important in terms of 
transforming both the discourse of political elites and the key dimension in 
determining the dynamics of party competition. 
The September 2001 Parliamentary Election 
Following the results of the September 2001 Parliamentary election; the 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) gained the highest share of votes and formed a 
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coalition government with the Labour Union (UP). Still, they could not obtain an 
absolute parliamentary majority and formed a minority government with the 
participation of the agrarian, soft- Eurosceptic, Polish Peasant Party (PSL). 
Initially, the SLD-UP coalition invited the pro-EU Civic Platform (PO) to join the 
coalition. Although the Europhile SLD-UP coalition invited the center-right, pro-
EU Civic Platform (PO), the PO refused the invitation, which led to the eventual 
participation of the Polish Peasant Party, a soft-eurosceptic party.  
The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) is the strongest Europhile political force in 
Polish party politics alongside the Freedom Union (UW) and the Social 
Democrats (SdPL). From the perspective of Kopecky and Mudde, the SLD is a 
Euro-enthusiast party given its unconditional support both for the EU and the 
general ideas underlying the European integration in particular. Gaisbauer (2007: 
64) confirms the point by assessing the voting behavior of the MEPs of parties in 
the 2004 European Parliament on the issue of the European Constitutional Treaty 
(ECT). Accordingly, MEPs of the Democratic Left Alliance, the Freedom Union 
and the Social Democrats (SdPL) voted in favor of the ratification of the ECT.  
The party receiving the second highest number of votes was the Civic Platform 
(PO), formed in January 2001 as a liberal-conservative pro-EU party. Although 
the Civic Platform adopts a pro-EU approach, in contrast to the pro-EU, euro-
enthusiast Polish parties, the PO does not express unconditional support and hence 
cannot be classified among the list of euro-enthusiast parties.  As Gaisbauer 
(2007: 64) indicates, fourteen MEPs from the PO voted in favor of “Abstention” 
in the European Parliament on the ratification of the ECT, while only one MEP 
voted in favor. In this sense it is possible to argue that “abstention is clearly a 
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divergence from the pro-European „Yes‟ as well as the anti-European „No‟” 
(Gaisbauer, 2007: 64).  
Recalling that euro-enthusiast political parties are defined as those parties, which 
“support the general ideas of European integration and also believe that the EU 
is/will soon become the institutionalization of these ideas” (Kopecky and Mudde, 
2002: 231), it is possible to argue that the PO distances itself from a Europhile 
position. The voting behavior of the MEPs of the PO demonstrates that the party 
clearly distances itself from a position of unconditional support, while it does not 
oppose to European integration in principle.   
The PO formed the major opposition group in the 2001 Polish Parliament with the 
Law and Justice Party (PİS). Similar to the PO, the PİS was formed in April 2001, 
as a right-wing conservative party by Jaroslaw Kaczynski (Szczerbiak, 2001: 6). 
Although both parties had a pro-EU orientation, they criticized the government‟s 
soft negotiating stance towards the EU. In the words of the PO‟s leader:  
it would be safer if, in exchange for agreeing to the EU‟s position when it 
comes to access to EU labor markets, we could have obtained advantages in 
other areas such as structural funds, regional policy or agriculture. The 
government‟s position will certainly speed up the negotiations, but it is not 
just a case of being in the Union in 2004, but to be in it on the best possible 
conditions. As a Polish citizen I would prefer to be sure that our concessions 
are in exchange for their concessions. And I would also like to know what 
they are (cited in Szczerbiak, 2002: 10).  
 
Although Gaisbauer (2007:67) classifies the Civic Platform (PO) as a 
Euroenthusiast party according to Kopecky and Mudde‟s framework, its pro-EU 
profile does not necessarily prevent the party from expressing soft-
Euroscepticism. The PO shared the criticisms of the hard eurosceptic Self-
Defence and the League of Polish Families (LPR) that the government‟s 
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negotiating strategy with the EU risked Poland‟s national interest on a broad 
policy front (Szczerbiak, 2002). In this respect, the PO can be seen as a soft-
eurosceptic party. 
The Civic Platform‟s position on the issue of Europe and European integration 
conforms with Kopecky and Mudde‟s conceptualization of Eurosceptic parties, as 
“those parties and groups who support general ideas of the European integration 
underlying the EU, but are skeptical about the EU as a system that is developing 
in the direction that best embodies these ideas” (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002: 231). 
However, this definition does not help us understand the differences between the 
Euroscepticism of League of Polish Families, Self Defence and the Polish Peasant 
Party, which express different- hard and soft - versions of Euroscepticism. In this 
sense, the logic behind employing Szczerbiak and Taggart‟s conceptualization of 
Euroscepticism becomes evident. 
To begin with, The League of Polish Families (LPR) is a catholic, nationalist right 
–wing political party, which expresses opposition to both the EU and the idea of 
European integration. It fundamentally opposes Polish EU membership and 
accuses the EU of “conducting a policy of economic colonialism towards Poland” 
(Szczerbiak, 2002). The issue of European integration was heavily addressed by 
the party in its election program and was framed in terms of „colonization‟, 
through which the national assets of Poland would be colonized by EU countries. 
In the words of the vice-chairman of the LPR, Roman Giertych: “we did not fight 
for our independence for all those years only to now give away a portion of our 
sovereignty to some kind of a supranational organisation” (cited in Szczerbiak, 
2002).  In this sense the LPR is a hard-eurosceptic party in Szczerbiak and 
Taggart‟s terms. From Kopecky and Mudde‟s perspective, on the other hand, the 
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LPR is a Euro-reject party with a clearly Europhobe attitude as it fundamentally 
opposes the EU, European integration and perceives the EU as a threat to Polish 
economic and political sovereignty.  
Self-Defence is a radical-populist, agrarian party, which can be listed among the 
strong Eurosceptic forces in party politics. It emerged as the third largest grouping 
in the 2001 Parliament with a 10.2 % share of the vote. In contrast with the LPR, 
Self Defence did not state explicitly that it was against Polish EU membership but 
displayed strong Eurosceptic elements in its political rhetoric.  
In its 2001 election program Self Defence argued that “the SLD, PSL, AWS, UW 
and PO are implementing the same program of making Poland dependent on the 
West, selling out our national assets together with the liquidation of jobs. They 
have all gone mad about Brussels. But the truth is brutal; no one will give us 
something for nothing” (cited in Szczerbiak, 2002). The 2001 election program 
further stated that “Self Defence is opposed to integration with the European 
Union in the current form it exists today” (cited in Szczerbiak, 2002). Hence, in 
the case of Self Defence, it is possible to locate the position of the party between a 
soft and hard Eurosceptic stance since it does not explicitly rule out Polish EU 
membership as the League of Polish Families (LPR).  
Table 3: Political Parties in the 2001 Polish Parliament 
Party Votes (%) Seats 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD- UP) 41.04 216 
Civic Platform (PO) 12.68 65 
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Source: Polish State Electoral Commission, http://www.pkw.gov.pl/ 
 
On the other hand, although the Polish Peasant Party used to be a coalition partner 
during the 1993-1997 SLD-UP led government, its participation in the 2001-2005 
SLD-UP led coalition generated further obstacles to the working of the pro-EU 
SLD-UP coalition, given the fact that the PSL advocated a hard stance on the 
accession negotiations, reflected in Kalinowski‟s election campaigns in the run-up 
to the 2000 Polish presidential election.  
Although a minor coalition partner, the impact of the PSL on the pro-EU SLD-UP 
coalition, which adopted a soft negotiating strategy, proved to be more influential 
than expected. The SLD-UP coalition faced serious constraints on its freedom of 
maneuver concerning specific policy negotiations and concessions. The 
government had to change its negotiation policy package concerning specific 
policy chapters on agriculture, which carried crucial importance for the rural-
agrarian constituency of the PSL. In this sense, the PSL‟s politics of 
Euroscepticism is mainly a national interest and policy based Euroscepticism, 
which makes it possible to classify this party as soft Eurosceptic. 
As a result, the most striking feature of the 2001 parliamentary election is the 
interpretation of the electoral results „as representing some kind of a “ Eurosceptic 
Self-Defence (Samoobrona) 10.20 53 
Law and Justice (PİS) 9.50 44 
Polish Peasant Party (PSL) 8.98 42 
League of Polish Families (LPR) 7.87 38 
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backlash” ‟ (Szczerbiak, 2002). The argument is reasonable, given the fact that it 
marks the first instance of the salience of the politics of party-based 
Euroscepticism in post-communist Polish party politics. It is of crucial importance 
to stress that out of the six parties that entered Parliament four of them; (the Self-
Defence, the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), the League of Polish Families (LPR) and 
the Civic Platform) made use of a Eurosceptic discourse and expressed party-
based Euroscepticism in their hard and soft versions.  
Hence, the 2001 Polish Parliamentary elections provide a counter case for 
Taggart‟s argument that mainstream parties do not express Euroscepticism. 
Although Szczerbiak and Taggart (2002) reformulated this argument in later years 
arguing that mainstream parties can adopt soft Eurosceptic positions, the Polish 
case clearly shows that the politics of Euroscepticism, even its hard form, is not a 
feature of political parties that are peripheral or marginal to their party systems. 
The 2001 election results show that mainstream agrarian parties express harder 
versions of Euroscepticism; mainly the League of Polish Families and Self 
Defence. On the other hand, national –interest based Euroscepticism brings 
together political parties from different ideologies as well as different positions on 
the issue of Europe and European integration. The Civic Platform, which was 
founded as a liberal conservative, pro-EU party shared the same concerns with 
anti-EU political forces on the issue of the government‟s negotiating strategy with 
the EU.  
 The 2005 Parliamentary Election 
The 2005 parliamentary election results led to the formation of a coalition 
government composed of the Law and Justice Party (PİS) and the Civic Platform 
 83 
 
(PO), who had gained 27% and 24.1% of the votes respectively. The 
dissatisfaction with the previous SLD-UP government and its minor coalition 
partner, the PSL, was reflected in the voters‟ electoral preferences in the 2005 
contest. Although the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) took over office with the 
objective of accelerating Poland‟s accession negotiations, the government lost 
popularity and suffered a significant decline in its vote share in 2005 
parliamentary elections. According to Szczerbiak (2005: 2), the root causes of the 
failure of the SLD-UP government were „due to an accumulation of problems‟, 
identified as follows: 
Stubbornly high levels of unemployment meant that, when it came, 
economic recovery did not filter down to ordinary Poles and produce a 
tangible „feel good‟; continued in-fighting within the government and 
between premier Miller and the Democratic Left Alliance- backed 
president Aleksander Kwasniewski; and the government‟s incompetent 
handling of certain key policy areas. 
 
Table 4: Political Parties in the 2005 Polish Parliament 
Party Votes Seats 
Law and Justice (PİS) 27.0 155 
Civic Platform (PO) 24.1 133 
Self-Defence (Samoobrona) 11.4 56 
Democratic Left Alliance- Labour 
Union (SLD- UP) 
11.3 55 
League of Polish Families (LPR) 8.0 34 
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Source: Polish State Electoral Commission, http://www.pkw.gov.pl/ 
 
Although the public did not elect hard-eurosceptic forces to the government,the 
2005 electoral results brought Parliament two parties; the Law and Justice and the 
Civic Platform, which strongly criticized the previous government‟s handling of 
the negotiations in particular and European policy in general. They also made use 
of national interest based rhetoric, without damaging their pro-EU profiles. On the 
other hand, hard Eurosceptic political parties did not face a decrease in their 
electoral support. This is significant because the Self Defence and especially the 
League of Polish Families are both hard eurosceptic parties and particularly the 
latter strongly campaigned by opposing Polish EU membership. The 2005 
parliamentary election results revealed voters‟ disapproval with the government‟s 
performance and reflected the significant influence of national –interest based 
Eurosceptic rhetoric on voters‟ preferences in the context of post-accession.  
The two main centre-right parties, the Civic Platform (PO) and the traditionalist- 
conservative Law and Justice (PİS), which strongly campaigned by defending the  
Polish national interest in the context of pre-accession while retaining their pro-
EU profiles, seized the opportunity to raise their electoral strength in the 2005 
parliamentary election, and formed the government.  
The Law and Justice Party (PİS), which was in opposition during the 2001-2005 
SLD-UP government, heavily addressed the issue of Europe and Poland‟s 
membership in the run up to 2005 parliamentary elections in its election 
campaign. The party published a comprehensive 144-page document in 2005, in 
Polish Peasant Party (PSL) 6.7 25 
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which the issue of Europe was addressed by a total of twenty-eight paragraphs 
(Szczerbiak and Bil, 2008: 15). On the other hand, the Civic Platform did not 
publish an updated election program for the 2005 parliamentary elections.  
Although Szczerbiak and Bil (2008) argue that, in comparison to previous election 
programs of Polish political parties, there is a significant increase in the space 
devoted to the issue of Europe in the 2005 parliamentary elections (Szczerbiak 
and Bil, 2008: 16), the case of the Civic Platform requires deeper attention on the 
grounds that the discussion of EU policy did not exist in its party election 
manifesto in 2005. With regards to the policy sections of the Civic Platform party 
program, „there was an increase from only two policy sections, where the EU was 
mentioned in 2001, to four sections in 2005‟ (Szczerbiak and Bil, 2008: 18), 
which included security policy, economic policy, transport and agriculture. On the 
other hand, Szczerbiak and Bil (2008: 18-9) point to the fact that the Law and 
Justice party devoted more space than any other party in both the 2001 and 2005 
parliamentary elections. The major campaigning theme in the party election 
manifestos of Law and Justice has been Poland‟s economic and foreign policy 
priorities and directions (Szczerbiak and Bil, 2008: 18-9).  
4.3 The June 2003 Polish EU Accession Referendum  
Despite the existence of a strong Eurosceptic representation in the Polish 
parliament, and the significant disapproval of the SLD-UP government‟s 
performance in the eyes of the voters, the referendum for Polish EU accession was 
concluded in June 2003 with an overwhelming majority, 77.45 %, voting in favor 
of accession (Szczerbiak, 2003: 2). 
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As Table 5 indicates below, the criterion of at least 50 % of voter turn-out to make 
the referendum valid was reached. Although only a little more than half of Polish 
voters went to the polls, 45.25 % out of 58.85 % of registered voters voted YES in 
the referendum, despite the fragile domestic political climate in the aftermath of 
the recent collapse of the SLD-UP and PSL coalition just a few months before the 
accession referendum.   
Table 5: The 2003 Polish EU Accession Referendum 
 Total % of Registered 
Votes 
% of Valid 
Votes 
Yes 13 516 612 45.25 77.45 
No 3 936 012 13.18 22.55 
  Source: Polish State Electoral Commission, http://www.pkw.gov.pl 
 
President Kwasniewski started a Yes campaign under the title of „Yes for Poland‟. 
The SLD-UP coalition government also called for a Yes vote. Although the PSL 
and the PİS strongly criticized the SLD-UP coalition government for its weak 
negotiating strategy and inability to protect the Polish national interest against the 
costs of membership, they supported a Yes campaign by using the slogan „A 
strong Poland in the European Union‟ (Szczerbiak, 2003: 5). 
On the other hand, the No campaigners included the most hard-eurosceptic 
political party, the League of Polish Families ( LPR) and Self-Defence, whose 
leader is the best known critic of Polish EU membership, Andrej Lepper 
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(Szczerbiak, 2003: 6). The LPR viewed the issue of membership as a tangible 
threat to Polish independence and sovereignty and coined the slogan „Yesterday 
Moscow, Tomorrow Brussels‟ (Szczerbiak, 2003: 6). On the other hand, the Self 
Defence did not rule out Polish EU membership in principle, but maintained a 
neutral campaign under the slogan „The Choice is Yours‟ (Szczerbiak, 2003: 6). 
Although the SLD-UP government faced a strong opposition from both pro-EU 
and Eurosceptic political parties, the Civic Platform (PO) and the Law and Justice 
(PİS) allied themselves with the SLD-UP government attempting to generate mass 
support for Polish membership.  
As a result, the most prominent features of the 2003 Polish Accession 
Referendum appear to be two-fold. Firstly, the referendum results and the 
overwhelming majority of the “Yes” vote highlighted that the mass public is able 
to decouple the issue of membership from disapproval with the government‟s 
performance. Secondly, the battle between the Yes campaigners and No 
campaigners resulted in favor of the former, which framed the Polish accession to 
the EU in terms of an inevitable historical process of ending the Cold War 
divisions. Hence the distinction between voting for a YES or a NO vote became a 
matter of „a civilisational choice‟. On the other hand, the NO campaigners framed 
Polish accession within the limited scope of the negative consequences of EU 
membership on Polish national interests, and heavily drew upon the economic 
costs of accession. The No campaigners could not provide a united front in terms 
of representing their strong arguments, which consisted of reservations towards 
the future trajectory of the EU and the negative costs associated with the 
membership.  
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4.4 The June 2004 European Parliament Election 
The 2004 European Parliament election resulted into an extremely low turn-out 
rate, %20.87, the second lowest turn-out in the EU (Szczerbiak, 2004: 1). The 
2004 EP elections were overshadowed by the domestic political crisis over the 
formation of a new government, and electoral campaigns in the run up to the EP 
elections did not display an overarching European dimension, as “ voters were 
asked to cast their ballots on the basis of national manifestos” (Chan, 2004 : 12). 
In this respect, voters‟ preferences in the 2004 EP elections were shaped on the 
basis of the performance of national governments, which explains the failure of 
the 2001 government in the 2004 EP election. 
Table 6: The June 2004 Polish Election to the European Parliament 
Party Votes % MEPs 
Civic Platform 1 467 775 24.10 15 
League of Polish Families 969 689 15.92 10 
Law and Justice 771 858 12.67 7 
Self-Defence 656 782 10.78 6 
Democratic Left Alliance- 
Labour Union 
596 311 9.35 5 
Freedom Union 446 549 7.33 4 
Polish Peasant Party 386 340 6.34 4 
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Polish Social Democracy 324 707 5.33 3 
Source: Polish State Electoral Commission, 
http://www.pkw.gov.pl/gallery/10/17/10174.pdf 
The European element in the party campaigns was restricted to the aim of 
mobilizing voters around the issue of “who would best represent Poland‟s 
interests, either in general terms or by referring to specific policy areas” 
(Szczerbiak, 2004: 5).  
Polish political parties did not run a separate political campaign for the EP 
elections. However, the Constitutional Treaty was the issue through which 
political parties displayed a European dimension in their campaigns. They acted 
as channels of political mobilization over the issue of the ratification of the 
Constitutional Treaty and a Eurosceptic political discourse was the main feature 
underlying the parties‟ mobilization strategy.  
Even the most pro-EU political parties, such as the Civic Platform (PO), used the 
slogan “Nice Treaty or Death”. The PO called for “the retention of the Council of 
Ministers voting system under the Nice Treaty, which has given Poland a stronger 
role in the decision making process than it will be under the terms of the draft 
Constitutional Treaty” (Chan, 2004: 17).  
On the other hand, the League of Polish Families, Self-Defence and the Law and 
Justice Party employed a strong Eurosceptic rhetoric. Self –Defence “called for a 
complete re-negotiation of the accession terms and eventual withdrawal from the 
EU is the new terms were still unsatisfactory” (Chan, 2004: 18). The Law and 
Justice, whose EP election campaign was entitled “Honourable Representation in 
Europe”, made use of a soft eurosceptic political discourse. This was manifest in 
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its strong support for an intergovernmentalist approach to European Integration 
and concerns about the EU‟s future trajectory.  
In a similar vein, the League of Polish Families (LPR) expressed its rejection of 
Polish EU membership on nationalist and ideological grounds, which was 
manifest through its slogan for the 2003 referendum as „Yesterday Moscow, 
Today Brussels‟. The LPR used the same slogan for its EP election campaign and 
strongly advocated hard euroscepticism by asserting that the EU is the biggest 
threat to Poland. Despite its hard euroscepticism, it needs to be underlined that 
this party is not peripheral to Poland‟s party system. Furthermore, given the fact 
that 77.45% voted Yes for Poland‟s EU membership in the 2003 accession 
referendum, the LPR received the second highest share of votes in the EP 
election, followed by other hard and soft Eurosceptic parties, the Law and Justice 
and Self-Defence, whose positions are also mainstream parties.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
EUROSCEPTICISM AS A FEATURE OF MAINSTREAM CZECH 
PARTY POLITICS 
 
 
 
The Europeanization of Czech party politics reveals significant insights 
concerning the diversity of the responses of political parties to the 
Europeanization pressures and their attitudes towards European integration. This 
chapter focuses on the Czech party system and politics in the pre and post-
accession periods with the objective of exposing how „nationally unique 
conditions and factors‟ lead to divergent forms of Europeanization of national 
party politics (Baun et al. 2006: 254). Secondly, the chapter aims to demonstrate 
that the politics of Euroscepticism can offer viable ground for domestic party 
opposition and can be utilized as a powerful strategy for electoral competition, 
although the issue of Europe does not have to become a new political cleavage in 
the party systems of candidate and new member states at the domestic level.  
The chapter analyzes changes in party programs of three major political parties in 
the run up to the 1998, 2002 and 2006 parliamentary elections. Thus, it will be 
possible to observe the role played by Czech political parties in framing the issue 
of Europe and constructing the national discourse on the question of Czech 
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membership to the EU in particular, and European integration more generally. 
Secondly, in addition to the analysis of the changes in the party programs of the 
major Czech political parties, the analysis of three national parliamentary 
elections will demonstrate how further commitment to EU integration, which 
“exposes mainstream parties to charges of abandoning the national interest or 
sovereignty” (Ladrech, 2004: 54), opens up political space for the emergence of 
anti-EU political parties or anti-EU politics within the established political parties. 
In this respect, the chapter explores the origins and development of three 
mainstream political parties‟ positions on Europe and European integration, the 
Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the Czech Social Democrats (CSSD) and the 
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM). It does so by paying 
attention to their soft vs. hard Eurosceptic or Europhile political rhetoric, and the 
extent to which there is evidence of Europeanization on their party election 
programme in light of their electoral results in the 1998, 2002 and 2006 Czech 
parliamentary elections. The classification of the main Czech political parties 
according to their positions on the issue of Europe and European integration can 
be described as follows: 
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Support for European Integration 
                         Europhobe                       Europhile  
  
       
Support for 
the EU 
EU-
optimistic 
  
 
EU-
pessimistic 
 
 
5.1 The Analysis of Czech Parliamentary Elections 
The June 1998 Czech Parliamentary Election 
The June 1998 Parliamentary election marks the beginning of the development of 
Czech political parties‟ positions on the issue of Europe and European integration. 
The issue of European integration in general and the question of Czech EU 
membership in particular were not the major themes of Czech political discussion 
until the late 1990s (Kopecky, 2004: 226). Until the 1998 election, Czech political 
parties‟ discourse on the issue of European integration was characterized with the 
Euro-
enthusiasts 
The Czech 
Social 
Democratic 
Party (CSSD)  
 
Euro-pragmatists 
Soft-
Eurosceptics 
The Civic 
Democratic 
Union (ODS) 
Hard- Eurosceptics 
/Eurorejetcs 
The Communist Party of 
Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) 
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“Return to Europe” spirit and the Czech EU membership was widely accepted as 
the main foreign policy goal by all political parties since the first democratic 
elections in June 1990 (Baun et al., 2006: 256).  
Table 7: 1998 Chamber of Deputies Election Results 
Source:  Czech Statistical Office,  
http://electionresources.org/cz/chamber.php?election=1998 
 
As Table 1 indicates, the Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD), which used to 
be a marginal political force in the aftermath of 1989, outpolled the ODS and 
established itself as a party of government with 32.3 %  in the 1998 elections. In 
the aftermath of the election results, the CSSD did not invite the ODS to form a 
coalition government on the grounds that the Klaus government‟s narrow vision 
of national interest sharply contradicted with the Czech national interest. 
According to the CSSD, the Czech national interest could not be defined without 
the objective of full EU membership. In contrast to the ODS, the CSSD was 
Party Votes % Seats 
Czech Social Democratic Party 
(ČSSD)  
1,928,660 32.3 74 
 Civic Democratic Party (ODS)  1,656,011 27.7 63 
Communist Party of Bohemia and 
Moravia (KSČM)  
658,550 11.0 24 
Christian and Democratic Union - 
Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-
ČSL)  
537,013 9.0 20 
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strongly in favor of European integration and highlighted the positive aspects of 
Czech membership (Hlousek and Pseja, 2004).  
The CSSD is the strongest Europhile political force in Czech party politics. It 
defines itself in relation to its categorical rejection of Euroscepticism. In sharp 
contrast to the ODS, the CSSD endorses the current political and economic 
direction of the EU. It anticipates and advocates “the deepening of economic and 
political integration through a gradual strengthening of democracy and federative 
elements” by strengthening the role of both the European Parliament and the 
European Commission (Hanley, 2002: 7).  
In the CSSD view, the EU is a means to reconcile conflicting national interests, 
overcome the historical marginalization of small states such as the Czech 
Republic and protect them against the political and economic threats of 
globalization. Similarly, the CSSD views the EU as a „multidimensional European 
community‟, which will „help the Czech Republic to prosper, achieve security and 
stability, improve its international position and facilitate the access of its citizens 
to education and employment opportunities‟ (Baun et al., 2006: 257).  
From the perspective of Kopecky and Mudde (2002), the CSSD is a Europhile 
political party, which expresses both diffuse and specific support. The CSSD‟s 
unconditional support both for the economic and political deepening through 
integration confirms with Kopecky and Mudde (2002) definition of diffuse 
support. On the other hand, the CSSD also articulates specific support for the EU, 
defined as support for the general practice of European integration (Kopecky, 
2004: 230), as it advocates the supranational direction of the EU‟s development.   
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The strong pro-European element was manifest, albeit in the form of general 
statements, in the CSSD‟s 1998 election program, entitled “Together With You 
for a Better Future”. This called for a closer link between foreign policy and 
internal political developments. The CSSD defined the foreign policy objective of 
the Czech Republic solely in terms of EU accession, which constituted the overall 
priority of its election program (Baun et al., 2006: 257; Havlik and Vykoupilova, 
2008: 172). It articulated its strong support for cooperation with the European 
Commission for the Czech Republic‟s efforts in its pre-entry strategy. The issue 
of European integration was addressed in the foreign policy chapter of the 
program, which confirmed the Czech entry to the Union as the chief foreign 
policy objective.  
On the other hand, the ODS articulated its vision of the EU in its 1998 election 
program, entitled  “Head Up”, which was divided into seven sections. The ODS 
program is significant because it is the ODS‟s first election program in opposition. 
The program consists of six chapters in addition to the preamble, which are titled 
“ We don‟t see the recent past as black and white and we are ready to defend it”; 
“ODS: Protecting Democracy and Freedom”; “Four podebrad articles”; “We 
defend the national interest”; “The Secure State”; and  finally “ The Family: a 
proposal for four generations”. Among these six chapters, the issues of Europe 
and European integration are addressed under the chapter on National Interest. It 
is of crucial significance to outline the essential difference between the CSSD‟s 
and the ODS‟s vision of the EU by looking at the ways in which the issues of 
Europe and European Integration are addressed in their election programme.  
The CSSD views Czech membership primarily as a foreign policy objective, 
which represents the peak of Czech national interest, whereas the ODS 
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approaches the issue of Europe and Czech membership solely from a national 
interest based perspective, which frames Czech membership as contradictory to 
the Czech national interest. However, this national interest-based framing of 
Czech membership and the issue of European integration, rather than setting it as 
a prior foreign policy objective, reflects a significant shift in light of the previous 
1996 election program.  
In sharp contrast to the 1998 election program, the ODS addresses the issue of 
Europe and Czech membership in its 1996 election program entitled “Freedom 
and Prosperity”, in the foreign policy section of the chapter on the “Powers of the 
State” (Havlik and Vykoupilova, 2008: 169).  The “Return to Europe” spirit 
appears as the main theme in the discussions concerning the Czech membership 
and European integration, which are characterized as a “long-term process 
guaranteeing member states of the European Union peace , stability, safety, 
freedom and economic prosperity” (Freedom and Prosperity, 1996: 9 cited in 
Havlik and Vykoupilova, 2008 ). The ODS further articulated its support for the 
“expansion of the European Union and its openness toward the rest of the world, 
as well as deepening its political cooperation and the creation of a single internal 
market within the European Union” (Freedom and Prosperity, 1996: 9 cited in 
Havlik and Vykoupilova, 2008).  
On the other hand, the election programme , although re-articulating the party‟s 
support for the Czech Republic‟s objective of full EU membership, explicitly 
addressed the importance of the Czech nation state and further criticized “the 
European model of the social state and rejected the “dispersion” of the Czech 
Republic into supranational structures” (Havlik and Vykoupilova, 2008 : 170). 
Hence, the shift in the ODS‟s position from being the party of government to 
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party of opposition was reflected in the form of a move towards a soft Eurosceptic 
attitude grounded in national interest clearly evident in its 1998 election program. 
While the 1996 election programme expressed the normative aspect of EU 
membership, the 1998 programme relied primarily on a reaction to particular 
aspects of European integration, which entailed a criticism towards the European 
institutional structure and policies grounded in a strong defense of Czech national 
interests.     
On the other hand, the 1998 election programme of the Communist Party of 
Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM), entitled “Others Talk About the People, We are 
with the People”, includes a separate chapter devoted to the issue of Europe titled 
“A Firm Place for the Czech Republic in Europe”. This followed the preceding 
policy line stated in its previous 1996 election programme. The 1996 election 
programme, entitled Socialism – A Chance for the Future, addressed the issue of 
European integration under a chapter on foreign policy, entitled “Peace and 
Cooperation” (Havlik and  Vykoupilova, 2008: 174). In that piece, the Communist 
Party did not refer to specific statements on the form of European integration. On 
the EU, they declared that they would support for Czech entry. However, the 1996 
election programme clearly articulated what the KSCM was strictly against, 
namely the „subjugation to the interests of supranational capital and world powers, 
loss of national sovereignty and the social victimization of citizens” (Havlik and 
Vykoupilova, 2008: 174). Although the party stated its sympathy with the idea of 
Czech membership, the 1996 election program expressed a conditional support for 
European integration. In that sense, the KSCM expressed support for European 
integration as long as it would be guaranteed that the Czech Republic would not 
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become „a colony‟ and join the Union on a non-discriminatory basis, receiving 
equal status as the old member states (Baun et al., 2006: 258).  
In a similar vein to the 1998 election programme of the ODS, the KSCM stressed 
the necessity of a referendum through which the Czech people could express their 
opinion on Czech membership and evaluate both the costs and benefits of 
integration. Another common element between the ODS and KSCM relates to 
their emphasis on Czech statehood and rejection of supranational governance. The 
KSCM‟s support for European integration was dependent on the continuity of 
state sovereignty and restriction of EU powers” (Baun et al., 2006: 259).    
The 2002 Parliamentary Election 
The Czech Social Democrats finished the June 2002 parliamentary election as the 
first political party polling 30.2 %. The election is of crucial significance due to 
several reasons. First, the 2002 election results produced the first majority 
government headed by the Czech Social Democratic Party, which confirmed its 
status as the first major incumbent centre-left party anywhere in post-communist 
Central and Eastern Europe to win successive elections. Secondly, the 2002 
election results proved two opposite trends for the Communist Party of Bohemia 
and Moravia and the Civic Democratic Party. The Communist Party demonstrated 
its best electoral performance ever by receiving 18.5 %. Although the electoral 
success of the Communist party offered the Czech Social Democrats the 
opportunity to form a coalition government, the Social Democrats (CSSD) 
produced a coalition government with the Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL) and 
the Liberals (US-DEU), received 14.3% of votes. 
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The Europeanization of Czech political parties is most evident in the capability of 
the issue of Europe to shape the election programs of political parties, which 
started to develop specific positions concerning Czech membership and the 
question of European integration since the end of the 1990s. Hence the election 
programmes of political parties in the run up to the 2002 national elections 
illustrate the increasing prominence of the issue of Europe and European 
integration in domestic political issues. While the 
Table 8: 2002 Chamber of Deputies Election Results    
Party Votes % Seats 
Czech Social Democratic Party 
(ČSSD)  
1,440,279 30.2 70 
Civic Democratic Party (ODS)  1,166,975 24.5 58 
Communist Party of Bohemia and 
Moravia (KSČM)  
882,653 18.5 41 
KDU-ČSL and US-DEU   680,671 14.3 31 
Association of Independents 
(SN)  
132,699 2.8 0 
 Green Party (SZ)  112,929 2.4 0 
 Source: Czech Statistical Office, 
http://electionresources.org/cz/chamber.php?election=2002 
 
party election programs of the 1990s can be described with reference to a 
common rhetorical emphasis on „back to Europe‟, the political agenda of political 
parties in the run up to the 2002 national elections reflects significant 
 101 
 
programmatic changes, which transcended the general statements of the previous 
decade and created a differentiation among political parties on the basis of Czech 
membership and European integration.  
Hlousek and Pseja (2004) put forward four major themes in which the issue of 
Europe is evidently manifest in the party election programmes: (1) accession and 
membership; (2) the future of Europe and Czech position within the EU; (3) the 
issue of EU funds in terms of the financial benefits that the Czech Republic will 
gain out of EU membership and (4) an emphasis on the promotion of equal rights 
between the old and new members in an enlarged Union. Among these four fields, 
the future direction of European integration and Czech position within the EU 
constitute the mainstream effects on shaping political parties‟ positions towards 
the benefits and costs of Czech membership and the broader question of the 
position of the Czech Republic in the EU.  
The election program of the Czech Social Democrats for the 2002 elections, 
entitled “People First”, heavily draws upon the impact of Czech membership on 
individual demands, needs and benefits for Czech citizens. In this vein, the 
benefits of Czech membership are framed under the objective of attaining 
individual dignity. Accordingly, the program posits that “accessibility to work 
represents for us a basic condition for a dignified life for every citizen. The entry 
of the Czech Republic into the EU may provide substantial help in this” (Havlik 
and Vykoupilova, 2008: 173). The program of the CSSD did not include any 
statement of critique towards the EU and European integration as a continuum of 
their adoption of a significant pro-EU stance and Europhile attitude.  
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The 1996 election program of the CSSD clearly identified the party with the 
principles of the Maastricht Treaty and defined its position towards the question 
of Czech membership and European integration on the basis of opposition to the 
ODS stance, which adopted a nationalist based, soft-eurosceptic discourse without 
questioning the necessity of Czech membership. In opposition to the position of 
the ODS, the 1996 election program of the CSSD clearly stated: “ We reject a 
negative approach to the European Union, the nationalist position and 
megalomaniacal pontifications which would only lead to the isolation of the 
Czech Republic” (cited in Havlik et al., 2008: 172).   
While the issue of the position of the Czech Republic in the EU was not given 
priority by the election programs of the Social Democrats, the ODS articulated its 
support for Czech membership on condition that the Czech Republic will be 
placed “at the level of an equal partner of the member states of the Union” 
(Havlik and Vykoupilova, 2008: 169). In contrast to the CSSD‟s opposition of a 
nationalist viewpoint, the ODS placed the role of the nation-state at the core of 
European integration and advocated support for Czech membership as long as the 
process of European integration would guarantee the promotion of Czech national 
interests.  
In the run up to the 2002 national elections, the ODS published „The Manifesto of 
Czech Eurorealism 2001‟, a political document aiming to contribute to the 
discussion of the EU in order to explicitly state the viewpoint of the ODS, its 
ideology and position concerning the current and future trajectory of European 
integration and Czech membership. The document consists of nine pages and is 
divided into four sections entitled „European Union: present situation, future 
trends; The project of enlargement to the East; Czech Republic and European 
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Union; Alternative, Substitute and Other Solutions‟. Among the four sections, the 
second and the third are given priority, where the benefits and costs of accession 
are discussed in detail and the form of the EU that the ODS wants the Czech 
Republic to join appears as the major theme in the document.  
With regard to the second chapter, entitled “The Project of Enlargement to the 
East”, the number of pages devoted to the discussion of the costs of accession is 
significantly higher than the benefits. The ODS viewpoint of the European 
integration is one of confrontation, as seen in the following passage: “It is 
necessary to realize that European integration had, has and will have principally 
the form of confrontation (naturally non-violent) of various political, economic 
and strategic interests” (Zahradil, 2001: 3). Accordingly, the ODS anticipates 
three main forms of confrontation out of the current and future state of European 
integration. The first form is defined as “the confrontation of European interests 
(the common interests of European bureaucracy, European institutions and 
member states) with the interests of the world‟s other centers”. The second form 
of confrontation is “the clash of interests between the European bureaucracy and 
individual member states” (Zahradil, 2001: 3), and the final form is defined in 
terms of a “confrontation among the individual regional or local entities and 
lobbies within each member state as well as within the EU as a whole” (Zahradil, 
2001: 3).   
In addition to the articulation of existing different forms of confrontations, the 
ODS refers to the “democratic deficit” inherent in the European institutions and is 
strongly critical of the status of the European Commission as an executive body as 
well as the identification of the member states with the notion of “European 
Citizenship” (Zahradil, 2001: 3). Finally, the ODS‟s third main criticism relates to 
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the concept of political integration, which is defined in terms of the Union‟s 
objective towards building a common foreign and security policy.  
In light of all these criticisms, the ODS discusses the supranational and 
intergovernmental models of European integration and, in contrast to the CSSD‟s 
supranational approach, states its preference in favor of an intergovernmental 
model, which is defined as the “cooperation of member states on equal terms and 
on a multilateral basis” as opposed to the supranational model described as “a 
unified European state with strong supranational institutions” (Zahradil, 2001: 3). 
Another significant point needs to be made concerning the implications of the 
ODS‟s understanding of the benefits of enlargement. The document devotes only 
a paragraph to discuss the benefits of enlargement, which are solely conceived in 
terms favorable to the member states of Western Europe, the EU-15 (Zahradil, 
2001: 2). In that sense, the enlargement process is perceived as a strategic benefit 
to those member states which desire the stabilization of Eastern Europe for their 
own security. Alternatively, the eastern enlargement process is perceived to favor 
“the interests of countries that oppose further intensification of the integration 
process” (Zahradil, 2001: 2). It is further stated that “the accession of new 
members, bound to cause a certain diffusion of the EU, may help them in their 
effort to stop supranational integration tendencies”. In this respect, it is important 
to notice the fact that the ODS does not express any statement in favor of 
European integration as a process which entails benefits for the enhancement of 
Czech national interest but sees it as solely serving the interests of existing 
member states.  
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The third chapter, entitled “Czech Republic and the European Union”, discusses 
the compatibility of supranational elements and principles of the EU with Czech 
statehood and arrives at the conclusion that the EU is incompatible with the 
founding ideals of the Czech state, defined on the basis of an Anglo-Saxon 
tradition of liberal conservatism. According to the ODS, Czech statehood 
advocates “a freely established European unity of loosely connected and 
cooperating states” (Zahradil, 2001: 4). In that respect, although the ODS defines 
Czech membership as one of the strategic goals of Czech Republic, it nevertheless 
urges the public to evaluate the utility of Czech membership in light of Czech 
national interests defined as “the ensuring of territorial integrity, political 
sovereignty, independence, stability and security”. Under the same chapter, the 
subtitle “We want an intergovernmental model” articulates the ODS‟s desired 
model of European integration (Zahradil, 2001: 4): 
European integration must be a bottom-to-top process; it must 
come from below, from European nations and citizens of Member 
States represented by their parliaments and governments, not from 
the office desks of the European political and bureaucratic elite. 
We should reject further unnatural „intensification‟ of the 
integration process tending toward a federal state 
 
On the basis of the above, the ODS derives its eurosceptic attitude towards Czech 
membership and the issue of European integration from the concrete problems 
embedded within the current state of European integration that the ODS believes 
the EU is facing. In that respect, the ODS advocates a conditional support for EU 
entry given the prospective challenges that the Czech Republic would face under 
the current conditions of European integration. In this vein, the ODS makes the 
case as follows (Zahradil, 2001: 5): 
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We must reject further extension of competencies granted to the 
European Commission as a non-elected, executive and 
administrative body with no direct electoral mandate. We must also 
reject new competencies for the European Parliament. Since there 
is no such thing as “European” public or “European” electorate, the 
EP can never become a genuine parliamentary institution reflecting 
“all-European” interests, but will rather always resemble a body of 
representatives speaking for various national, regional, local and 
other interests or lobbies.  
In light of all these, the ODS evaluates the reliability of the promise of EU 
membership, and stresses the necessity to explore possible future directions and 
alternatives in Czech foreign policy in case the Czech Republic does not join the 
EU. Being a full member of NATO, and accession to EFTA and NAFTA are 
considered the best foreign policy alternatives, which could provide the Czech 
Republic with access to the European market and strengthen the transatlantic 
security relationship with the United States (Zahradil, 2001: 6). 
The 2002 election programme of the KSCM, entitled “With the People, For the 
People”, clearly expresses its distrust towards European integration and lack of 
support for Czech membership. In contrast to the 1998 election programme, the 
KSCM does not address the issue of European integration and Czech membership 
under a separate chapter. The emphasis on national interest continues to play a 
major role in defending a cautious and sceptic attitude towards membership. The 
primacy assigned to the defense of the national interest is evidently manifest in 
the 2002 election programme, in which the issue of entry and future role of the 
Czech Republic in the EU is addressed in a subchapter entitled “We support the 
National Interest Only in a Secure World” (cited in Havlik and  Vykoupilova, 
2008: 175). In the case of the KSCM, the identification of national interest with 
anti- EU politics contributes to the consolidation of the party‟s position in the 
mainstream of Czech party politics.  
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A comparison between the 1998 and 2002 election programmes demonstrates a 
shift in the reservations of the KSCM towards the issue of Europe and Czech 
membership. While the 1998 election program placed strong emphasis on the 
danger of subjugation by the old member states and Czech Republic‟ colonization, 
the 2002 election programme draws its policy line and “Euroreject” position on 
the basis of the defense of the national interest broadly defined in terms of 
sovereignty without necessarily pointing to a political economy dimension.    
The 2006 Czech Parliamentary Election  
The Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the main center-right catch-all party in Czech 
party politics, won the 2006 Parliamentary elections after two successive terms in 
opposition. As the election results indicate on Table 3, the ODS gained 35.4 % 
and the party faced the challenge of forming a majority government coalition. The 
Social Democrats were second with 32.3 %, and the Communists third with 
12.8% of the votes. Eventually, the ODS formed a coalition government with the 
Christian Democrats and the Greens. 
 
Table 9: 2006 Chamber of Deputies Election Results 
 
Party Votes % Seats 
Civic Democratic Party (ODS)  1,892,475 35.4 81 
Czech Social Democratic Party 
(ČSSD)  
1,728,827 32.3 74 
Communist Party of Bohemia and 685,328 12.8 26 
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Moravia (KSČM)  
Christian and Democratic Union - 
Czechoslovak People's Party 
(KDU-ČSL)  
386,706 7.2 13 
Green Party (SZ)  336,487 6.3 6 
Source: Czech Statistical Office,      
http://electionresources.org/cz/chamber.php?election=2006 
 
The 2006 election programme of the Civic Democrats, entitled “Together for a 
Better       Life”, introduced a social reform programme and addressed specific 
policy areas, in which the party‟s position on European Integration is expressed 
under the chapter on Czech Foreign Policy. The chapter, “PLUS For Czech 
Foreign Policy”, is divided into two sections in which the position of Czech 
Republic is discussed and the ODS‟s conception of the ideal form of the EU is 
formulated (Havlik and Vykoupilova, 2008: 163). It is of crucial importance to 
note that the issues of Europe and European integration are no longer major 
themes of discussion under an independent chapter.  
Although the ODS firmly states that the Czech Republic does not have a viable 
alternative than to continue with effective EU membership, the 2006  election 
program displays a declining trend in the attention paid to the issue of Europe and 
European integration in comparison to previous election programs and party 
documents. In the previous election cycle, the party had published two separate 
documents entitled “National Interest in the Real World” and “The Manifesto of 
Czech Euro-realism”, which substantively discussed the issues of Europe, the 
Czech position in the EU and the desired form of European integration in detail. 
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However as far as the 2006 parliamentary election is concerned, the ODS 
addresses the issue of Europe with respect to domestic policy. In that sense, 
notwithstanding the decreasing urgency and salience of the issue of Europe and 
European integration, the 2006 election program can be regarded as a sign of 
Europeanization of domestic party political discourse since particular EU issues 
gain in importance as long as they have significant repercussions for domestic 
political discussions.  
As far as the domestic political context of the 2006 elections is concerned, the 
greater salience of the domestic policy areas for the Civic Democratic Party can 
be best illustrated by the quotation below, which is a declaration on the official 
party website that discusses the features of the 2006 election programme (ODS,      
http://www.ods.cz/en/policy) 
ODS achieved victory in the 2006 parliamentary elections with the reform 
program "Together for a better life". In the program, ODS offered a 
friendly, fair state which values all basic human and civil rights, which does 
not engage in needless incursions into the lives of its citizens and which 
limits bureaucracy to the necessary minimum. ODS calls for an open society 
undivided by artificial social barriers, one which does not decide based upon 
the origin or momentary social position of its members. 
 
A comparison between the 2002 and 2006 election programmes uncovers a shift 
in the ODS‟s conception of the relation between the national interest and 
European Integration. In the 2002 election period, the ODS definition of national 
interest is embedded within a conflictual understanding of the effects of European 
integration. Furthermore, the ODS felt the necessity to declare its intention to 
pursue alternative foreign policy options, in the Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism, 
in case the Czech Republic‟s bid for EU membership was overruled either by the 
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EU or by the Czech people. However, the main themes of the political approach 
adopted by the ODS during the 2006 election period are expressed within the 
context of domestic socio-economic issues.  
In this sense, in contrast to the previous election, the issue of Europe and 
European Integration does not form the cornerstone of the ODS‟s 2006 election 
program. Rather these are integrated into prevailing socio-economic cleavages. 
Hence, in the context of 2006 parliamentary election the main theme of electoral 
competition between the two main poles of Czech party politics is not defined in 
terms of the parties‟ positions regarding the issue of Europe, the Czech position in 
the EU and European Integration, but rather in terms of the parties‟ adopted policy 
perspectives and positions on domestic socio-economic issues. However the 2002 
electoral campaign of the ODS used an extensive anti-EU discourse, manifested 
itself in the form of a euro-realist rhetoric on the issues of Europe, the Czech 
position in the EU and European Integration.  Although the bi-polar structure of 
the electoral competition between the CSSD and the ODS remains a constant in 
Czech party politics, the main themes of competition, which may give rise to the 
formation of new political cleavages or become integrated into the existing ones, 
present a change as the domestic context changes.  
The electoral campaign of the 2002 election was significantly influenced by the 
atmosphere of the forthcoming referendum on Czech accession and secondly, it 
was the last national election in the context of Czech pre-accession, which was 
effectively utilized by the opposition ODS party to attack the incumbent 
government from a euro-realist perspective. On the contrary, the 2006 election is 
the first national electoral contestation, which led to the formation of center-right 
coalition led by the ODS, in the aftermath of the 2004 enlargement. In this 
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respect, the incumbent ODS, which used to be in opposition until the 2006 
elections, adopted a milder version of its previous hard eurosceptic discourse. The 
issue of European integration lost its independent status as a major theme of 
domestic political discussion and was located under discussions on Czech foreign 
policy. Hence, the salience of the issue of Europe and European integration 
decreased as the distinction between the domestic and the foreign arena became 
even more distinct in the 2006 election program, which prioritized domestic 
socio-economic issues over foreign policy concerns.  
On the other hand, the 2006 election program of the CSSD, entitled “Security and 
Prosperity”, manifests the constant pro-EU element in the position of the CSSD 
by devoting an independent chapter on European Integration, which consolidates 
the party ideology and position regarding the issue of Europe and European 
integration in terms of its opposition to the European policy of the ODS (Havlik 
and Vykoupilova, 2008: 173). In contrast to the criticisms of the ODS concerning 
the European Constitution, the CSSD advocates unconditional support for the 
notion of European citizenship and European Constitution (Havlik and 
Vykoupilova , 2008: 174).  
With regards to the KSCM, which preserves its stable electoral position by 
finishing third, the 2006 election program entitled “The Election Program of the 
Communist party of Bohemia and Moravia for the 2006-2010” devotes minimum 
space to Europe. Although the KSCM is a hard eurosceptic party, which always 
expressed opposition to Czech membership, for the first time the 2006 program 
responds to the reality of Czech membership, and  “with critical reservations, 
respects the membership of the Czech Republic in the European Union” (Volebni 
program KSCM, 2006, online).  
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5.2 The 2003 Czech EU Accession Referendum 
The 2003 Accession referendum outcome is a clear indication of an 
overwhelming political consensus on the issue of EU membership, which is 
manifested not only in the high percentage of voters who voted Yes, but more 
significantly by the relatively high turnout of 55%. Given the greater salience of 
the primary order elections for domestic politics, the strong 55% turn out rate was 
“only slightly below the 58 percent figure for the June 2002 parliamentary 
elections” (Baun et al., 2006: 264).   
 Table 10: The June 2003 EU Accession Referendum Results in the Czech 
Republic 
 Total % of Registered 
Votes 
% Valid 
Votes 
Yes 3 446 
758 
 
41.73 
 
77.33 
 
 
No 
 
1 010 
448 
 
12.23 
 
22.67             
Source: Central Election Commission, www.volby.cz 
The pro-EU coalition led by the Social Democrats entitled their campaign “the 
Information Campaign”. Although political parties‟ positions on the issue of 
Europe and Czech accession were manifest in their 2002 election campaigns, both 
the incumbent and the opposition parties led active referendum campaigns. The 
incumbent 2002 government, composed of the Social Democrats (CSSD), the 
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Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL), and the Freedom Union Coalition (US-DEU), 
represented the pro-European coalition, expressing support for Czech accession 
and a federal EU without any reservations.  
On the other hand, the opposition parties, the ODS and the KSCM, did not 
participate in the pro-accession campaign on the basis of their reservations 
regarding EU membership. Although the Civic Democrats define their orientation 
as pro-European and supported Czech accession, as opposed to the incumbent 
government‟s approach, they expressed support for an intergovernmental model 
of the EU and had reservations regarding the issue of EU membership. Recalling 
the euro-realist position of the party during the post-1998 period, the ODS argued 
that the party did not need to lead a pro-accession campaign given the pro-
European orientation of its voters (Hanley, 2003:6). However, the ODS position 
on accession referendum presents an ambiguous case due to the fact that it did not 
explicitly run either a Yes or a No campaign. Rather, the ODS advocated that “the 
pro-accession campaigners were missing the point that the form of the EU 
mattered far more than mere accession to it” (Hanley, 2003: 6). On this basis, the 
party further expressed its criticisms that the pro-accession campaign disregarded 
the costs of accession. Within this context, the ODS instrumentalized opposition 
to the pro-accession campaign, despite its support for Czech membership, as an 
electoral strategy to oppose the incumbent government‟s European policy in order 
to justify the need for a re-formulation of an assertive Czech policy as prescribed 
by the Manifesto of Czech Euro-Realism. 
On the other hand, the accession referendum led to a division within the 
Communist Party, as the only mainstream hard- eurosceptic party. The KSCM 
refrained from adopting an explicit stance on accession until March, when it 
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stated that it adopts “a Moderate No” position of “not recommending” EU 
membership (Hanley, 2003: 8). Accordingly, the least amount of Yes votes came 
from the KSCM voters, with 37 % voting for and 63 % voting against (Baun et 
al., 2006: 264; Hanley, 2003: 11). 
5.3 The 2004 European Parliament Election   
The analysis of the 2004 European Parliament elections matters for understanding 
the dynamics and functions of the politics of Euroscepticism as well as the role 
this plays in Czech party politics. The 2004 EP elections partly owes its 
significance to the fact that it is the first election since the EU expanded to twenty 
five member states, and it was the first time that parties from the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe contested a transnational election.  However, the 2004 
European Parliament elections resulted in the “lowest average turnout across the 
EU since the introduction of elections to the chamber by direct universal suffrage” 
(Chan, 2004: 4). A comparative examination of the average turnout rates in the 
EU-15 and those of the new EU-10 countries; Cyprus, Malta, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, demonstrates 
that the EU-15 has an average of 49.1 %, whereas the new EU-10 displays an 
average of 26.9% (Chan, 2004: 5). 
As Table 11 indicates below, with the exception of Lithuania, neither of the CEE 
countries have a higher average turnout rate than the average EU-15 member 
states. This indicates the greater level of apathy amongst voters in the Central and 
Eastern European countries compared to the citizens of the EU-15 (Chan, 2004: 
7). Among the CEECs, it can be stated that the Czech Republic displays a 
significant level of a lack of interest alongside Estonia and Poland. 
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Table 11: The 2004 European Parliament Elections Turnout in the CEECs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: European Union, http://www.elections2004.eu.int/ep-
election/sites/en/index.html 
The 2004 European Parliament election results substantially changed the 
prevailing balance of political forces in Czech party politics. The ODS and the 
KSCM, both in opposition during the 2002- 2006 term, gained an overwhelming 
electoral success. On the other hand, the parties from the coalition government 
witnessed public dissatisfaction with very low levels of support. The main party 
of government, the pro-EU CSSD, could only receive 8.78 %, although the party 
had been the strongest supporter of Czech membership and European Integration 
since its foundation.  
 
Country No. of 
voters 
% Votes 
Czech 
Republic 
8 283 485 28,3 2 346 010 
Estonia 873 809 26,8 234 485 
Hungary 8 046 247 38,5 3 097 657 
Latvia 1 397 736 41,3 577 879 
Lithuania 2 654 311 48,4 1 284 050 
Poland 29 986 109 20,9 6 258 550 
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Table 12: Czech Political Parties Standing in the 2004 European Parliament    
Elections: 
Parties Valid 
Votes 
Valid Votes in 
% 
The Civic Democratic Party (ODS) 700 942 30.04 
The Communist Party of Bohemia and 
Moravia (KSCM) 
472 862 20.26 
The Czech People‟s Party (KDU-CSL) 223 383 9.57 
The Independents ( NEZ) 191 025 8.18 
         Source: Czech Republic Statistical Office (CSU),        
http://www.volby.cz/pls/ep2004/ep141?xjazyk=EN 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
In its broadest sense, the Europeanization literature is defined as the study of the 
impact of European Integration on member states. The Europeanization of 
candidate states and new member states has only recently become a subject matter 
within the broad reserach agenda of Europeanization. As the second chapter 
showed, the literature on the Europeanization of candidate and new member states 
owes its development to the pre-accession adjustment processes of the candidate 
states of Central and Eastern Europe. In this respect, the study of the unique 
experiences of CEE candidate countries provides a rich empirical material, which 
further expands the scope of the Europeanization literature, through the discovery 
of new variables within new domestic contexts (Schimmelfenning and 
Sedelmeier, 2005: 5) 
 Although the Europeanization literature identifies three major strands of research 
on the basis of a differentiation between the polity, policy and politics dimensions, 
the vast majority of Europeanization studies pay considerable attention to the 
impact of the development of European level institutions and policy-making on 
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national level processes of decision-making, policy implementation and 
institutionalization. Hence, a specific focus on the changes and transformation of 
domestic politics, mainly political parties, party systems and party competition 
structures, is often neglected at the expense of studies on polity and policy 
dimensions, which are assumed to manifest more profound, tangible and 
significant outputs of Europeanization. However, as the scope and magnitude of 
European integration has become deeper and bigger, the politics dimension, which 
concerns the study of national political parties, party systems and party 
competition, has gained considerable significance within the scholarly literature, 
although it is still in the stage of development considering the greater extent of 
studies addressing the Europeanizaiton of polity and policy dimensions. In this 
sense, this study attempted to contribute to the development of an up and coming 
research agenda by focusing on the relation between European integration and 
national party politics.  
To return to the limited impact of Europe on the politics dimension argument,  
this assumption is reinforced by some scholars writing on the Europeanization of 
national party systems. To illustrate the point, Peter Mair identifies “two obvious 
ways in which Europe might be seen to have had an impact” (Mair, 1999: 29), the 
format and mechanics of national party systems. Accordingly, the process of 
Europeanization can impact upon the format of the national party systems as long 
as it leads to the formation of new political parties and thereby increases „the 
number of relevant parties in contention in national electoral arenas‟ (Mair, 1999: 
29). On the other hand, the national party sytems are considered to be 
Europeanized as long as the mechanics of the party systems is affected. In Mair‟s 
(1999: 30) words the mechanics of the party system is defined as follows: 
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the way in which parties interact with one another in the national election 
arenas, either by modifying the ideological distances separating the 
relevant parties, or by encouraging the emergence of wholly new 
European-centred dimensions of competition. 
 
On the basis of the above, Mair evaluates the extent of Europeanization of 
national party systems of member states on the basis of these two features, “as the 
key defining elements of any party system” (Mair, 1999: 30), and asserts that 
Europe in general,(and European integration in particular) do not generate direct 
impacts of Europeanization on national party systems of EU member states. It is 
further claimed that Europe has a limited impact on the party systems of member 
states.  
However, in light of the findings of this study on mainstream political parties in 
Poland and the Czech Republic, the Mair argument could be modified. To begin 
with, Mair‟s framework does not pay attention to the question of how the issue of 
Europe plays a role in shaping individual party attitudes and positions concerning 
European integration. By adopting a system level approach, that is, by solely 
analyzing whether there is a change in the core determinants of the party systems, 
it fails to recognize the constitutive relation between the individual and system 
levels of analysis. The individual level of analysis entails the study of the relation 
between the issue of Europe and the process of European integration, and the 
development of individual political parties‟ position on these issues. As the 
previous empirical chapters on Poland and Czech Republic indicate, this relation 
is significant, due to the fact that any changes in the support of  mainstream 
political parties‟ positions on the European issue either in a positive or negative 
direction, affects the development of other political parties‟ positions and attitudes 
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on the same issues in the context of national electoral competition. The analysis of 
individual political parties‟ positions and attitudes on the issue of Europe and 
European integration in Czech and Polish party politics demonstrates how further 
commitment to EU integration, which “exposes mainstream parties to charges of 
abandoning the national interest or sovereignty” (Ladrech, 2004: 54), opens up a 
political space for the emergence of anti-EU political parties or anti-EU politics 
within the established political parties in a Central and Eastern European context.  
Pro-EU parties may prefer to harden their europhile positions by mobilizing their 
electoral base on the issue of Europe, and may even represent themselves as 
single-issue pro-EU political parties during the pre-election period depending on 
the electoral strength of the political parties that make use of an anti-EU rhetoric. 
The June 1998 Parliamentary election marks the beginning of the development of 
Czech political parties‟ positions on the issue of Europe and European integration, 
although Czechoslovakia‟s „Return to Europe‟ had been widely accepted as the 
main foreign policy goal by all political parties since the first democratic elections 
in June 1990 (Baun et al., 2006: 256).   
The case of the Czech Social Democrats electoral success in the 1998 Czech 
parliamentary elections perfectly illustrates the point. Therefore, the 1998 Czech 
parliamentary election is not only significant due to the fact that it is the first 
national election to be held in the aftermath of the opening of official accession 
negotiations with the first group of Central and Eastern European countries, of 
which Czech Republic and Poland were members, but because it is the first time 
when the issue of Europe and the question of EU membership entered the 
domestic political discourse.The Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD), which 
used to be a marginal political force in the aftermath of 1989 outpolled the ODS 
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and established itself as a party of government with 32.3 % in 1998 elections. It 
owes its electoral success mostly to its strong Europhile attitude position, which 
was manifested in its 1998 election program. Its 1998 program accused the 
eurosceptic position of the previous ODS -led Klaus government, and defined its 
European policy in an absolute rejection of Euroscepticism.  
Secondly, pro-EU parties may be inclined to make use of soft eurosceptic 
positions and political discourse, without necessarily damaging their europhile 
profiles, in order to respond to the prevailing reservations and sceptic attitudes of 
the public to prevent a possible decline in electoral support. As the chapter on 
Poland showed, the Civic Platform, which was founded as a liberal-conservative 
pro-EU party and is known to be the most pro-EU political party in the Polish 
party landscape, adopted a harder version of its soft-eurosceptic attitude in the run 
up to the 2004 European Elections by employing an anti-EU political rhetoric 
through the use of the slogan of “Nice Treaty or Death”. It did so to express 
opposition to the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty. As a result, an 
observable, significant shift in the position and attitude of pro-EU political parties 
can take two forms: first, they can be either more assertive of their europhile 
attitude and become hard euro-supporters, or they can be supportive of expressing 
criticisms and discussing the costs, rather than the benefits, of EU membership 
and become soft-eurosceptics. In both cases, this can even become an electoral 
strategy to differentiate themselves from other pro-EU parties.  
On the other hand, the same trend is observable in the case of eurosceptic political 
parties that may harden their soft-Eurosceptic attitude and become hard-
Eurosceptics, that fundamentally question the necessity of EU membership and 
even express opposition to the issue (although implicitly if a mainstream 
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governmental party). Alternatively, a hard-eurosceptic political party may adopt a 
milder version of its euroscepticism and become a soft eurosceptic party by 
neglecting its previous rejection of support for the issue of Europe and European 
integration. Both political strategies can be adopted on the basis of a concern to 
differentiate themselves from other eurosceptic parties eligible for domestic 
electoral competition.  
As a result, recalling Peter Mair‟s definition of the mechanics of party system, 
which is based on “the way in which parties interact with one another in the 
national election arenas, either by modifying the ideological distances separating 
the relevant parties, or by encouraging the emergence of wholly new European-
centred dimensions of competition” (Mair, 1999: 30), the individual analysis of 
political parties‟ positions and attitudes on the issues of Europe and European 
integration is a fundamental necessity if one is looking for the effects of 
Europeanization on party politics. In that sense, the study of the politics of 
Euroscepticism becomes a major component of the study of Europeanization of 
national party politics and party systems, as individual political parties, conceived 
as both institutional and social actors with political agency, possess the capability 
to affect the patterns, in this case the format, of national party competition and 
thereby change the mechanics of national party systems.       
On the other hand, depending on the magnitude of the influence of such Europe- 
specific party attitudes, which are manifest in soft or hard versions of a political 
party-based eurosceptic rhetoric, on the patterns of national party competition and 
party politics, the issue of Europe may even encourage the formation of new 
political parties and thereby affect the format of the party systems. In the case of 
the Czech Republic, three political parties; the Green Party (SZ), the Democratic 
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Union (DEU), and the Freedom Union (US), were founded during the pre-1998 
Czech parliamentary election period and a strong pro-EU element is a common 
feature for all these parties. Furthermore, the aforementioned three political 
parties established themselves as single-issue pro-EU parties on the basis of 
unconditional support for Czech EU membership and adopted a pro-EU policy 
line and the europhile rhetoric of the Czech Social Democrats (CSSD). Among 
these parties, it is of particular importance to underline the electoral succes of the 
Freedom Union (US), which received 8.6 % of the votes and managed to become 
a junior coalition partner in the 1998 Czech government.  
In light of the discussion above, this study contributes to the analysis of the 
Europeanization of national political parties and party systems and underscores 
the limited extent to which Western –european party based developed concepts 
can be exported in the context of Central and Eastern Europe. It does so through 
the analysis of Europeanization of political parties and patterns of party 
competition with a particular focus on the role of the politics of Euroscepticism in 
Poland and the Czech Republic.  
As the discussion in the first chapter indicated, Europeanization East substantially 
differs from the equivalent in the West on the basis of a variety of striking 
differences in terms of their points of departure. In general terms, the 
Europeanization process in CEE countries coincides with their transition to 
democracy and market economies. Furthermore, Europeanization East begins 
under the “shadow” of the accession negotiations, which exert high pressures on 
candidate states due to EU membership conditionalities (Heritier, 2005: 206). This 
study demonstrates the need for developing context-specific analytical tools to 
study CEEC‟s europeanization processes by drawing upon country-specific 
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empirical analysis of Europeanization of political parties and the role of the 
politics of Euroscepticism in national party systems.  
In addition to the need to stress the distinctive character of the CEEC‟s 
Europeanization processes, this study advocates a differential understanding of 
Europeanization by implementing a comparative analysis of the politics of 
Euroscepticism in Poland and the Czech Republic. While highlighting the 
distinctive features of Europeanization East from its Western counterpart, this 
study does not aim to advocate the development of different conceptual/ 
theoretical models of Europeanization in exclusive / rigid/ binary-opposition 
terms, but rather attempts to highlight the fact that the extent and outcomes of 
Europeanization, and how it functions, heavily depends on the national context 
that one examines.  
In that sense, although the literature on Europeanization of member and new 
candidate states  presuppose a convergence effect of Europeanization, this study 
offers a rather different result, that is, the Europeanization of national politics 
result in more divergence than convergence, due to the distinctive features of 
national political settings. This study is able to reach this conclusion from the 
empirical analysis of the politics of Euroscepticism in two different national party 
systems from Central and Eastern Europe. By the late 1990s, both countries began 
to distance themselves from the euro-idealism of the early post-communist years, 
when accession to the European Union was framed within the „Return to Europe‟ 
argument, as realistic evaluations of the advantages and disadvantages of 
membership became a major theme of political debate at the mass public opinion 
and political party elite levels. The politics of Euroscepticism functioned 
differently in the party politics and system of these two different CEE countries.  
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In Poland, anti-EU rhetoric is adopted by almost all mainstream parties and hence 
the politics of Euroscepticism functions as a re-aligning issue, which provides 
common political ground for the Eurosceptic and pro-EU forces in case the Polish 
national interest is perceived to be at stake (such as in the case of the 
Constitutional Treaty). On the other hand, in the Czech Republic, the politics of 
Euroscepticism is evidently adopted by the main party of the center-right, the 
ODS, and the Communists. They are both mainstream parties in the Czech party 
system, although the Communists have never been a coalition partner.  
On the basis of the above, this study incorporates individual (political parties), 
national (country-specific variables of domestic politics), and system level 
(patterns of national part political contestation/ party system characteristics) 
factors in the analysis of the relationship between the Europeanization of national 
party politics and party-based Euroscepticism. By assigning a primary role to the 
agency of political parties and by recognizing the constitutive relation between 
parties and the structure of political competition in light of the process of 
Europeanization, this study addresses the question of how Europeanization of 
domestic party politics can be better understood. Hence, the ability of political 
parties to affect both the mechanics and format of their party systems in the 
Central and Eastern European context validates the relevance of Radaelli‟s (2000: 
3) conceptualization of Europeanization, which is defined as:  “Processes of (a) 
construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and 
norms which are first defined and consolidated in the  making of EU 
decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, 
political structures and public policies.”  
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In this sense, the process of Europeanization of domestic party politics is carried 
out through the agency of political parties on the basis of our analysis of the 
politics of Euroscepticism in Czech and Polish party politics. One of the major 
assumptions of Europeanization in the CEECs concerning the political parties‟ 
positions and attitudes on the issue of European integration is that the promise of 
full EU membership serves as leverage for mainstream political parties to distance 
themselves from anti-EU politics or any form of a Eurosceptic political discourse. 
This assumption is further consolidated by the salience of the “Return to Europe” 
argument in constructing a Europhile political consensus in the party politics of 
Central and Eastern Europe. However, this top-down approach of 
Europeanization, which does not foresee the possibility of a divergence in the 
ways in which political actors incorporate the issue of Europe “in the logic of 
domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies” (Radaelli, 
2000:3), fails to contribute to our understanding of the relation between the 
Europeanization of domestic party politics and the dynamics underlying party-
based Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe. 
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